University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

ScholarWorks@UARK
Annual of the Arkansas Natural Resources Law
Institute

School of Law

2-1996

Oil Field Pitfalls: Avoiding Environmental Liabilities Affecting
Petroleum and Natural Gas Drilling and Production
Walter G. Wright Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/anrlaw
Part of the Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons

Citation
Wright, W. G. (1996). Oil Field Pitfalls: Avoiding Environmental Liabilities Affecting Petroleum and Natural
Gas Drilling and Production. Annual of the Arkansas Natural Resources Law Institute. Retrieved from
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/anrlaw/32

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Annual of the Arkansas Natural Resources Law Institute by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

OIL FIELD PITFALLS—AVOIDING ENVIRONMENTAL
LIABILITIES AFFECTING PETROLEUM AND NATURAL
GAS DRILLING AND PRODUCTION
By: Walter G. Wright, Jr.

N atural Resources Law Institute

February 22, 1996
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the United States House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee. He is a partner
in the Little Rock, Arkansas, law firm of Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard,
P . L. L . C., where his practice focuses on environmental and petroleum matters. For the past
eight years, he has served as an adjunct professor of environmental law at the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. He also serves as counsel to the Arkansas Oil
Marketers Association and the Arkansas Recyclers Association. Walter earned his undergraduate
and law degrees from the University of Arkansas and a Masters of Law from George
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I.

K EY A PPLIC A BLE FED ER A L AND STA TE EN V IR O N M EN TA L PROG RAM S
A.

PENDING REVISIONS TO ADPC&E REGULATION N O S. 18 AND 19:
*
*

B.

N ote exem ptions
D e M inim is cut-offs

CERCLA:
1.

General:

Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to provide EPA with the authority
to clean up hazardous waste sites and otherwise protect public health and the environment
from releases o f hazardous substances. The enactment o f CERCLA gave EPA the authority
to require responsible parties to undertake immediate cleanup activities without prolonged
litigation to determine how the ultimate liability w ill be apportioned. If responsible parties
resist or are incapable o f conducting the cleanup, EPA or the state may act with federal
funds and seek cost recovery later. The program covers a broad range o f releases o f
hazardous substances into the environment - from accidental one-tim e spills to continuing or
intentional releases.
The CERCLA schem e is applicable to a "release" o f a "hazardous
substance" from a "facility." These key terms have been interpreted to have an incredible
breadth. Consequently, CERCLA actions have involved both inactive and active facilities,
buildings and unimproved properties.
CERCLA can impact a property or company transfer, whether through
a loan foreclosure, sim ple acquisition, or otherw ise, in three main ways:

cleanup costs;

(a)

persons who acquire contaminated property may be liable for

(b)
persons who acquire a company that sent hazardous substances
to a facility that has had a release (and the facility cannot properly deal with the problem); or

(c) CERCLA permits EPA to place a lien on contaminated property to
allow the governm ent to recoup its cleanup costs when the property is sold.
What is a hazardous substance?

thereof") cases:

(a)

Key petroleum exclusion ("petroleum, crude o il or any fraction

-
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*

W ilshire W estwood A ssociates v. ARCO. 881 F . 2d 801 (9th
Cir. 1989) (gasoline containing additives covered)

*

United States v. U .T . Alexander. C .A . G --86--267 (unreported)
(crude oil tank bottoms covered)

*

Cose v. Getty O il. 4 F . 3d 700 (9th Cir. 1993) (crude oil tank
bottoms not covered) (sedimentary materials and water separated
out containing chrysene)

*

United States v . W estern Processing C o ., 761 F. Supp. 713
(W .D . W ash. 1991) (gasoline and diesel tank bottoms outside
exclusion because contaminated with metals such as nickel,
cadmium, that flaked o ff tank w alls)

*

Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. California. 790 F. Supp.
983 (C .D . Cal. 1991) (benzene listing under 1990 CAA
Amendments doesn’t petroleum exclusion)

*

KN Energy. Inc. v. Sinclair Oil C orp., Haz. W aste Lit. Rep.
(Andrews) 29191 (D . W yo. Aug. 24, 1995) (petroleum refinery
liable under CERCLA for releasing small amounts o f
trichlorofluoromethane, ethylene chloride, trichloroethan,
tricloromethane, and methylene chloride which are not normally
found in petroleum products and therefore are not exempted by
the petroleum exclusion)

*

Caterair Int’l Corp. v. LCL Transit C o ., N o. 94-C -1049, 1995
WL 348045, Haz. W aste Lit. Rep. (Andrews) 28957 (N .D . 111.
June 5 , 1995) (prior operator o f truck refueling and maintenance
facility was not liable under CERCLA for release o f benzene,
ethylbenzene, toluene, xylene ("BETX") and polynuclear
aromatic hydrocarbons ("PNAs") since these substances are
indigenous components o f crude o il and therefore encompassed
with the petroleum exclusion).

(b)

Other relevant cases:

*

Jastran v. Phillips Petroleum C o ., 844 F. Supp. 1139 (G .D .
LA . 1994) (produced water not "hazardous substance," "pit
sludges" are)

(c)

"Arranger" cases dealing with recyclables and deposit return:

-
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*

United States v. C ello-Foil Products. In c., 848 F . Supp 1352
(W .D . M ich. 1994) (purchases o f solvent delivered in drums
were not subject to CERCLA arranger liability when they
returned empty drums containing solvent residues to vendor in
exchange for deposit)

*

United States v. Summit Equipment & Supplies. In c., 805 F.
Supp. 1422 (N .D . Ohio 1992) (sellers o f used equipment at
blind auction sales were liable as arrangers even if they did not
know that purchaser intended to use the equipment for scrap
metal

*

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal
C o .. 822 F. Supp. 322 (E .D . Va. 1993) (indirect seller o f
batteries to shredding facility liable as "arranger")
N ote possible Superfund legislative recycling revisions.

*

United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel, 806 F. Supp. 1346
(N .D . 111. 1992) (sale o f fly ash not "arrangement)

(d)

Other

*

Grand Truck Western Railroad Co. v. Acm e Belt Recoating.
In c., 859 F . Supp. 1125 (W .D . M ich. 1994) (easement holder
not liable under CERCLA as "owner")
A lso note "used oil" cases*

2.

Potentially Responsible Parties:

Section 107(a) o f CERCLA provides that response costs may be
recovered from four classes o f persons:
(a)
the owner or operator o f the site or facility; N ote-L easeholders
o f property: United States v . Argent. 21 ERC 1354 (D .N .M . 1984) (lessor held liable under
CERCLA Section 107 as "owner"); United States v. South Carolina R ecycling and D isposal.
653 F. Supp. 984 (D .S .C . 1984) (lessee o f site which sublet it to another liable as "owner");
United States v. Northernaire Plating C o ., 670 F . Supp. 742 (W .D . M ich. 1987) (lessee was
found to be an "operator" o f a facility);
(b)
any person who owned or operated the site or facility at the time
o f the hazardous substance disposal;

-
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(c) any person who arranged to have his or her own waste taken to the
site or facility for disposal or treatment; and
(d) any person who transported wastes for disposal or treatment to a
site he or she selected.
3.

Other Possibly Responsible Parties:

In addition to the four classes o f potentially responsible parties defined
above, the courts have interpreted the phrases "owner and operator" and "person who
arranged for disposal" to include the follow ing parties whose connection with the hazardous
substances is less "direct." Examples o f such parties include the following:
(a)
A secured creditor whose activities go beyond sim ple "indicia o f
ownership primarily to protect his security interests," but extend to participation and
oversight in the management o f facilities. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust
Company. 632 F . Supp. 573 (D . Md. 1986) (bank which foreclosed on a mortgage and took
possession o f the property liable as in "owner");
also United States v. M irabile. 15 ELR
20994 (E .D . Pa. 1985) (bank which participated in day-to-day operations at the site prior to
foreclosure sale may be liable as "operator"), but
United States v. Fleet Factors C orp.,
901 F . 2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (lender "participates in management" if it takes part in the
financial affairs o f the facility, even if the lender is not involved in the day-to-day operation
or management o f the facility, i.e . if there is a "capacity to influence" the hazardous waste
activities o f the debtor): Bergsoe M etal Corp. v. East Asiatic Company. N o. 89-35397, slip
op. (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 1990) (creditor must as a threshold matter, exercise actual management
authority before it can be held liable for action or inaction which results in the discharge o f
hazardous wastes - m erely having the power to get involved in management, but failing to
exercise it, is not enough); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing C o ., 30 ERC
1665 (Sept. 1, 1989) (court denied summary judgment to a bank that in 1982 foreclosed on
an industrial property later found to be contaminated - held that by taking a S h eriffs deed to
the property, bank forfeited its right to assert the secured creditor exem ption);
On June 5, 1991, the EPA proposed a regulation intended to clarify the
applicability o f CERCLA to various activities associated with financing (56. Fed. Reg.
28798). Specifically, the rule interprets the security interest exem ption under CERCLA
(found at CERCLA § 101(20)(A )) which exempts from CERCLA liability persons whose
"indicia o f ownership" in a facility are held primarily to protect the security interest,
provided they do not participate in the management o f the facility. Pressure from Congress
and the financial services industry was responsible for EPA’s action. The primary reason o f
this pressure was the financial industries’ concern about the previously cited U .S . v. Fleet
Factors Corp. decision. Dicta in this decision suggests that a secured creditor may be liable,
without being an operator, if he participates in the management o f a facility "to a degree
indicating a capacity to influence the corporations treatment o f hazardous waste." The
court’s opinion did not discuss what level o f participation would be sufficient to support the
-
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inference that a security holder’s involvem ent could influence operational decisions
concerning a facility’s treatment o f hazardous waste. To reduce the uncertainty, EPA issued
this proposed rule to specify the range o f perm issible actions that may be undertaken by the
holder o f a security interest within the bounds o f the Section 101(20)(A ) security interest
exem ption.
On April 23, 1992, EPA issued its long-awaited regulations on the
liability o f secured lenders for environmental clean-ups under the A gency’s Superfund
program .1 These regulations adopted with very little change the proposal that EPA
published alm ost a year ago.2 The regulations attempt to define the actions that secured
lenders may take with respect to contaminated com m ercial facilities without incurring
Superfund liability.
The exposure o f lenders to Superfund liability arises primarily out o f
the fact that the statute im poses responsibility for clean-ups on the current "owner or
operator" o f a facility, and any former "owner or operator" o f the facility at the time
hazardous substances were disposed of. The statute defines the phrase "owner or operator"
in very broad terms, but secured lenders are specifically excluded by the follow ing language:
[The] term ["owner or operator"] does not include a person,
w ho, without participating in the management o f a facility, holds
indicia o f ownership primarily to protect his security interest [.]3
E PA ’s lender liability regulations are designed to provide holders o f
security interests with a map for remaining within the bounds o f the security interest
exem ption. They allow a lender to engage in a broad range o f activities in the course o f
protecting a security interest in a facility subject to Superfund.
The EPA lender liability regulations clearly state that no action by a
covered lender prior to the creation o f the security interest can be considered evidence o f
"management participation" for purposes o f determining Superfund liability. EPA states that
such pre-loan activities are irrelevant for determining whether a covered lender has
participated in the facilities management after the tim e that indicia o f ownership are held
primarily to protect the security interest. Such clarification should provide a level o f comfort
to those lenders who either require, or them selves undertake certain environmental investigatory actions at facilities serving as collateral for a loan. H owever, in the atypical situation in

1 57 Federal Register 18344 (published April 29, 1992), to
be codified as 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100. The regulations also
address the liability of governmental entities which acquire
property involuntarily.
2

56 Federal Register 28798 (published June 24, 1991).

3

42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (A).
-
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which a financial institution either requires or performs remediation at a facility prior to
financing, Superfund liability as an "operator" is still a theoretical possibility. Appropriate
care should therefore be taken.
The EPA lender liability regulations also generally define what type o f
financing relationships are encompassed by the security interest exem ption. This is obviously
a critical issue for the lender to consider prior to the consummation o f a transaction. Two
key terms define the relationships encompassed by the EPA lending regulations.
First, the term "indicia o f ownership" is defined to include evidence o f
a security interest, evidence o f an interest in a security interest, or evidence o f an interest in
real or personal property securing a loan or other obligation, including any legal or equitable
title to real or personal property acquired incident to foreclosure and its equivalents. EPA
states that the exem ption protects a broad range o f transactions, and it covers all transactions
in which ownership indicia are held primarily to protect a security interest regardless o f the
transaction’s type, form or the nomenclature given to it. Traditional security interest in real
property, such as mortgages, liens and deed o f trust (covering both title-theory and lientheory jurisdictions) cover security interests under the EPA lender liability regulations, and
are considered to be indicia or evidence o f ownership in property held primarily to secure a
loan or other obligation.
In addition, EPA states that so-called "lease financing" transactions,
which are common financing transactions for equipment and other types o f personal property
are also treated as security interests. The type o f lease financing transactions clearly
encompassed include those in which the lessor does not initially select the leased property.
Instead, this is done by the lessee or third party. Further, during the initial lease or any release, the lessor does not control the daily operation and maintenance o f the property. Such
transactions typically include national bank lease financing, leveraged leases, and single
investor leases.
Second, whether a person’s ownership indicia brings it within the
definition o f "owner or operator” under Superfund is dependent upon its classification as
"primarily to protect the security interest." Therefore, the ownership interest must be
maintained primarily for the purpose o f, or primarily in connection with securing payment or
performance o f a loan or other obligation (a security interest), and not an interest in property
held for som e other reason. In general, a transaction that give rise to a security interest is
one that provides the holder with recourse against real or personal property o f the person
pledging the security; the purpose o f the interest is to secure the payment o f m oney, the
performance o f a duty, or som e other obligation.
The EPA notes that m ortgages, deeds o f trust, liens and title held
pursuant to lease financing transactions may be encompassed. Security interest may also
arise from transactions such as sale-and-leasebacks, conditional sales, installment sales, trust
receipt transactions and certain factoring agreements.
-
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The term "holder" as used in the EPA lender liability regulations is
considered to include the initial holder (such as the loan originator) and any subsequent
holder, such as a successor in interest, subsequent purchaser on the secondary market, loan
guarantor, surety, or other person who maintains indicia o f ownership primarily to protect
the security interest. The terms "indicia o f ownership" held "primarily to protect a security
interest" do not include evidence o f interest in the nature o f an investment in a facility, or an
ownership interest held primarily for any reason other than as protection for security interest.
Therefore, when a lender holds indicia o f ownership in a facility primarily for investment
purposes as opposed to assuring repayment o f a loan, the exem ption w ill not apply. Further,
the EPA lender liability regulations do not encompass circumstances in which a lender or any
person acts as a trustee, or in a non-lending capacity, or has any interest in a facility other
than as provided in the rule. Therefore, trust department functions are not protected by the
security interest exem ption.
D iligent lenders typically reserve the right to undertake certain
inspection activities at a facility serving as collateral. In the alternative, the loan documents
may specifically provide the lender the right to require the borrower to undertake certain
activities designed to ensure the facility’s continued com pliance with the relevant federal and
state environmental protection programs. If the lenders’ actions are deemed to constitute
"participation in the management o f the facility" the Superfund security exem ption is
forfeited. Therefore, in order to ensure that cautious lenders do not abstain from such
desirable activities, the EPA lender liability regulations clearly state that "participation in the
management o f the facility" means actual participation in the management or operation o f the
facility. It does not include the mere capacity or unexercised right or ability to influence
facility operations. The EPA lender liability regulations also supply a list o f activities
com m only undertaken by lenders that the agency considers to be consistent with holding
ownership indicia primarily to protect a security interest. The nonexclusive list includes:
(1)

requiring the borrower to clean up the vessel or facility during the term
o f the security interest;

(2)

requiring the borrower to com ply or com e into com pliance with
applicable federal, state, and local environmental statutes or regulations
during the term o f the security interest;

(3)

securing or exercising the authority to monitor and inspect the vessel or
facility (including on-site inspections);

(4)

monitoring the borrower's business or financial condition during the
term o f the security interest; or

(5)

requiring the borrower to com ply with any warranties, covenants,
conditions, representations, or prom ises.

-
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N ote that the activities identified in the EPA lender liability regulations are not the only ones
that may be undertaken by the lender without voiding the exem ption.
The lender is also permitted to undertake loan workout activities. This
term generally includes those actions by which a holder, at any tim e prior to foreclosure and
its equivalents, seeks to prevent, cure, or m itigate a default by the borrower or obligor; or to
preserve, or prevent the dim inution o f the value o f the security. A nonexclusive list o f
activities deem ed to be encom passed within this term include:
(1)

restructuring or renegotiating the terms o f the security interest;

(2)

requiring payment o f additional rent or interest;

(3)

exercising forbearance;

(4)

requiring or exercising the rights pursuant to an assignment o f counts;

(5)

requiring or exercising the rights pursuant to an escrow agreement
pertaining to amounts ow ing to an obligor;

(6)

providing specific or general financial or other guidance; or

(7)

exercising any right or remedy the holder is entitled to by law or under
any warranties, covenants, conditions, representations or promises from
the borrower.

The EPA lender liability regulations recognize that foreclosure and
possession o f property for purposes o f sale or liquidation is often the only remedy the lender
may have to secure the performance o f an obligation. The security interest is not forfeited
upon foreclosure, purchase at foreclosure sale or related activities as long as certain specific
requirements are met.
In general, a foreclosing lender must seek to sell or otherwise divest
itself o f foreclosed-on property in a reasonably expeditious manner using whatever
com m ercially reasonable means available or appropriate taking all facts and circumstances
into account. The lender cannot, consistent with the exem ption, reject or refuse offers for
the property that represent fair consideration for the asset. Specifically, the lender may
foreclose, liquidate, sell, or wind up operations and continue the enterprise in order to
protect the value o f the secured asset without incurring Superfund liability, unless the
security holder fails within tw elve months follow ing foreclosure to list and advertise the
property for sale. The lender is also prohibited from refusing a "bona fide o ffer." Note,
how ever, that defenses to CERCLA liability such as the secured creditor exemption are not
transferable to a subsequent purchaser.

-
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Several recent federal court decisions have cited or utilized the lender
liability regulations. One decision is W aterville Industries v. Finance Authority o f M ain.
948 F . 2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993). The litigation stemmed from efforts to clean up two waste
water lagoons at a defunct textile m ill in W aterville, M ain. First Hartford Corp. sold the
m ill property to W aterville T extile Developm ent C orp., a quasi-public corporation
unconnected with the appellee in this case, and then leased it back. Loans in connection with
the project were made to First Hartford by Society for Savings and secured by mortgages.
FAM E, an instrumentality o f the state o f M ain, guaranteed the loans. In 1980, First
Hartford defaulted on the loans. FAM E assumed First Hartford’s obligations and received
an assignm ent o f the mortgages. On March 14, 1980, FAM E became the title holder o f the
property. On that same day, FAM E leased the property back to First Hartford. Under the
lease, First Hartford had the option to purchase for $ 1 .00. FAM E was deemed protected by
the secured creditor exem ption.
In another case involving the lender liability regulations, the Bank o f
Montana-Butte ("Bank") has filed a motion for summary judgment against ARCO,
contending that the Bank is not liable to ARCO for Superfund contribution at the Montana
Pole and Treating plant. Atlantic R ichfield Co. v. Oaas. N o. C V -90-75-BU -PG H (D . M ont,
pending). ARCO filed its contribution action on the basis that the Bank’s management and
liquidation o f plant property subjected the Bank to Superfimd liability for: influencing the
management o f hazardous substances during the Bank’s ownership, operation, and control o f
the plant; selling contaminated plant equipment at an auction; and operating the plant in a
manner that prompted Montana to sue the Bank for operating an unlawful storage facility.
The Bank counters that an opinion letter which it received from U .S . EPA exonerates it from
liability. E PA ’s letter applies the standards contained in U .S . EPA ’s proposed lender
liability rule. The trial court has not yet ruled on the motion.
The court in United States v. M cLamb. 5 F . 3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993)
addressed the secured creditor exem ption. In 1979, the W achovia Bank & Trust ("Trust")
took a security interest in land that included a tract known as "Potters Pits" as collateral for a
loan it had made to one Auto Skipper. After Skipper defaulted, Trust bought the land as sole
bidder at a foreclosure sale. Several months later, Trust sold the land to the McLambs.
Contamination was later discovered on the property. Trust was named in a contribution suit
by several defendants.
The plaintiffs argued that Trust was liable for CERCLA or Superfund
contribution because it becam e and outright "owner" o f the site when it bought the property
because it did not act in a com m ercially reasonable manner after it took title. They claimed
that Trust failed to inform them o f a 1976 o il spill and cleanup operation before selling the
property. The appeals court rejected the argument based on the fact that Trust bought the
property only to protect its security interest because there were no other potential buyers.
The court noted that the record indicated no investm ent or profit m otive for acquiring the
property. It further noted that Trust did not engage in a bidding war at the foreclosure sale
and alm ost im m ediately placed it on the market. It is also important to note that the court
-
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declined to rely on lender liability regulations to support its findings, ruling that Trust
qualified for the statutory exem ption. H owever, the court did say the result probably would
have been the same if it had relied on EPA ’s interpretation o f the exem ption.
A United States magistrate in M cGuire v. Sigma Coatings. Ed. La.
Civ. N o. 91 -2 07 6 ruled that a financial institution which took over a borrower’s property
before Superfund was enacted into law and leased it to an alleged polluter had no CERCLA
liability. H e made the ruling in recommending dism issal o f defendant FINA O ils’
contribution counterclaim against plaintiff W hitney National Bank and the latter’s CERCLA
breach o f lease action stemming from the oil company’s alleged contamination o f property
leased from the bank.
The magistrate rejected the o il company’s argument that the bank
should be liable to it because the bank did not stop FINA at some point from polluting the
property. It stated that the bank was not consulted by the oil company with regard to how its
business should have been conducted. It had no capacity to exert control over their handling
o f hazardous substances or waste. He stated that the EPA does not expect a secured lender
to inspect the property before taking a lien thereon in order to qualify for the secured
creditor exem ption.
Unfortunately, on February 4 , 1994, U .S. Court o f Appeals for the
D istrict o f Columbia Circuit Court by a 2-1 vote, struck down the lender liability regulations
in CMA v. EPA . CA DC N o. 9 2 0 1 3 1 4 . The court held that EPA lacked authority to adopt
legislative rule that defines who is liable under CERCLA. The regulations therefore doe not
have force as a legislative rule. The court did not comment on the substance o f the
regulations. This invalidation o f course recreates som e o f the previous uncertainty lenders
faced. However, som e o f the previously cited decisions favored lender activities without
relying on the regulations. Courts may continue to look at to the regulations for guidance.
Congress may statutorily amend CERCLA because o f the regulations’
invalidation. A s a practical matter, however, the federal government is unlikely to assert a
claim under Superfund against lenders who relied on the lender liability regulations in good
faith during the legal challenge. O f course, states or private parties could still seek to
im pose liability upon such lenders. They may still be reviewed as guidance for when the
lender is deemed to have stayed within the secured creditor exemption.
A further concern is whether the lender liability regulations apply
retroactively. The EPA, however, has indicated that it w ill apply to all transactions, thus
making it retroactive.
The EPA lender liability regulations were an important step toward
clarifying the Superfund security exem ption. Certain activities and financial products are
clearly encompassed. H owever, there w ill obviously be certain non-listed activities or
transactions which w ill require interpretation.
-ll-

It is also imperative that lenders recognize the lim ited effect o f the EPA
lender liability regulations. They offer only EPA ’s interpretation o f select Superfund
provisions. W hile they have (and still may) offer protection against EPA enforcem ent
actions, they may not deter non-governmental entities from pursing private party Superfund
contribution actions. Superfund’s strict joint and sever liability provisions provide non
governm ental entities an incentive to seek contributions from as many parties as possible.
Therefore, the EPA lender liability regulations w ill not rem ove all Superfund exposure.
The EPA lender liability regulations do not, o f course, address the
other federal environm ental statutes and regulations. Som e o f the other key federal
environm ental statutes contain sim ilar security interest exem ption language. It is uncertain
whether these principles w ill be analogized to the other statutes. H ow ever, in the case o f the
federal Resource Conservation and Recovery A ct Subtitle I underground storage tank provi
sions, EPA has stated that it w ill develop similar guidance. N ote, that in the case o f
petroleum underground storage tanks, sophisticated financial institutions are beginning to
structure their financing transactions to take advantage o f trust funds available in Arkansas
and other states to somewhat m itigate the potential liabilities related to this equipment. The
impact on relevant Arkansas environmental statutes is even more uncertain.
Lenders must also recognize that statutory environmental liability is not
their only concern. O f equal importance, is the possibility that property that is contaminated
or on which developm ent cannot take place (i.e ., a Corps o f Engineers 4 0 4 wetland permit
cannot be obtained, etc.) can be just as devastating. Therefore, EPA lender liability
regulations do not address the potential impact on the collateral’s value.
Consequently, it is imperative that diligent lenders continue to develop
pre-loan environm ental assessm ent programs. In addition, since specifically authorized by
the EPA lender liability regulations, lenders should utilize loan documentation provisions that
provide the ability to monitor a facility’s condition. Environmental inspection rights or
provisions requiring notification o f the lender in the event o f any EPA/state environmental
reports can provide early warning o f events or conditions that may continue to impact the
value o f the collateral. The Arkansas State Bank Department has in fact recently issued a
guidance document entitled Managing Environmental Risk: A Practical
Guide (Dec. 1991) which encourages such actions.
Also note that
the FDIC has also issued standards addressing environmental risk
management that its member banks are expected to meet.
Please note that Congress is still considering
various legislative vehicles for providing additional protection
for financial institutions (including their trust d e p a r t m e n t s ) .
4.

Arkansas Remedial Action Trust Fund A c t :
(No petroleum e x c l u s i o n ) .
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5.

Arkansas Water Pollution Control A c t :
(No petroleum e x c lusion).

C.

NATURALLY OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE M A T E R I A L S :

D.

RCRA:

Each year, U.S. industries generate substantial quantities of solid wastes as residual materials from basic manufacturing processes.
In addition, hundreds of thousands of service
industry businesses [ranging from truck terminals (i.e., solvents) to dry cleaners (i.e., T C E ) ] generate smaller quantities
of materials.
Among these wastes are hazardous materials that
pose present or potential dangers to human health and the environment.
Uncontrolled disposal of such wastes on land has
already caused significant groundwater contamination in some
areas, and threatens eventual pollution at many other disposal
sites.
Improper storage or management of even small quantities
of these materials could jeopardize the value and safety of
thousands of active and inactive businesses and properties.
1.
Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act ("RCRA") regulates the generation, transportation,
treatment, storage, and disposal of "hazardous wastes."
42
U . S . C . S 6901 et. seq., as amended by Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984, November 8, 1984.
2.
RCRA primarily addresses active waste treatment,
storage or disposal facilities, while CERCLA addresses inactive
facilities.
However, under the citizen suit provision found at
Section 7002 (42 U.S.C. § 6972) and under the imminent hazardous
provisions at Section 7003 (42 U.S. C. § 6973), actions for
cleanup can be brought against past and present owners or operators of treatment, storage, or disposal facilities.
S e e , e.g .,
United States v. P r i c e . 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D.N.J. 1981), a f f 'd.
688 F. 2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982) (past and present owners held liable
under Section 7003); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical
and Chemical C o m p a n y . 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) c e r t . d e n i e d ,
56 U.S.L.W. 3244, 108 S. Ct. 146 (1987) (shareholders and officers
individually held liable under Section 7003); Vermont v. S t a c o ,
I n c . , 27 ERC 1084 ( D . V t . 1988) (shareholders and officers liable
because of having "ultimate authority to control").
3.

Operational Requ i r e m e n t s :
(a)

Identification of hazardous w a s t e :

Note:
RCRA exploration and production waste
exemption (drilling fluids, produced waters and other wastes
"associated" with
"C & P."
42 U . S . C . S 6921(b)(2)(A).
Also,
may still be subject to Superfund?
EPA studied this matter and
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issued a report to Congress in 1987.
EPA's formal regulatory
determination was issued in July, 1988 (53 Fed. Reg. 25446).
It
included:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)

Produced waters;
Drilling fluids;
Drill Cuttings;
Rigwash;
Drilling fluids and cutting from offshore
operations;
Geothermal production fluids;
Hydrogen sulfide abatement waste from
geothermal energy production;
Well completion, treatment, and stimulation
fluids;
Basic sediment, water, and other tank bottoms
from storage facilities that hold product and
exempt wastes;
Accumulated materials such as hydrocarbons,
solids, sand, and emulsion from production
separators, fluid treating vessels, and
production impoundments;
Pit sludges and contaminated bottoms from the
storage or disposal of exempt wastes;
Workover wastes;
Gas plant dehydration wastes;
Gas plant sweetening wastes for sulfur
removal;
Cooling tower blowdown;
Spent filters and backwash assuming that the
filter itself is not hazardous and the
residue is from an exempt waste;
Packing fluids;
Produced sand;
Pipe scale, hydrocarbon solids, hydrate, and
other materials removed from piping and
equipment prior to transportation;
Hydrocarbon-bearing soils (contaminated
so i l s ) ;
Pigging wastes from gathering lines;
Certain wastes from subsurface gas storage
and retrieval;
Constituents removed from produced waters
prior to re-injection or other disposal;
Liquid hydrocarbons removed from production
streams;
Gases from production streams;
Materials ejected from a well during blowdown
operations;
Waste crude oil from primary operations; and
Light organics volatilized from exempt waste
in reserve pits or impoundments
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Wastes not included are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)

(8)
(9)
(10)

(ID
(12)

(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)

Unused fracturing fluids or acids;
Gas plant cooling tower cleaning wastes;
Painting wastes;
Oil and gas service company wastes;
Vacuum truck and drum rinseate from trucks or
drums containing nonexempt wastes;
Refinery wastes;
Liquid and solid wastes generated by crude
oil tank bottom reclaimers;
Used equipment lubrication oils;
Waste compressor oil, filters, and blowdown;
Used hydraulic fluids;
Waste solvents;
Waste in transportation pipeline-related
pits;
Caustic or acid cleaners;
Boiler cleaning wastes;
Boiler refractory bricks;
Boiler scrubber fluids, sludges, and ash;
Incinerator ash;
Laboratory wastes;
Sanitary wastes;
Pesticide wastes;
Radioactive tracer wastes; and
Drums, insulation, and miscellaneous solid
wastes

Certain issues were clarified by EPA in 1993 (58 Fed. Reg. 15284
(March 23, 1993)).
Waste derived from treatment of exempt waste
remain exempt.
(i)

Overview:

To be considered a hazardous waste under
RCRA, a material must first fit the definition of "solid waste" that is, it must be a solid, liquid, or gas that is a discarded
material and is abandoned, recycled, or otherwise "inherently
waste-like.” Although this definition is quite expansive, there
are several specific regulatory exclusions and variances that
significantly narrow the reach of the RCRA program.
One important type of material excluded
from the definition of solid waste is any mixture of domestic
sewage and other wastes that passes through a sewer system to a
treatment plant.
The pre-treatment requirements under the Clean
Water Act are intended to regulate the amount and type of materials sent to a sewer.
Other materials excluded from the definition of solid waste include:
industrial wastewater discharges
subject to regulation under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act;
irrigation return flows; source, and wholly domestic sewage.
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The aspect of the RCRA program that is
most difficult to understand is the extent to which secondary
materials - such as sludges, spent materials, and byproducts that are recycled or used to produce other substances, become
"wastes" and thus are subject to RCRA.
Recycling material by
burning it for energy recovery may result in solid waste classification.
This classification includes those materials which are
used to produce a fuel or are otherwise contained in fuels.
In
the latter case, the fuel itself is a solid waste.
However,
commercial chemical products which are listed in 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.33 are not solid wastes if they are themselves fuels.
Materials that are being reclaimed are
solid wastes.
According to the definitional section, a material
is reclaimed "if it is processed to recover a usable product or
if it is regenerated."
Examples of reclaimed materials include
recovery of lead values from spent batteries and regeneration of
spent solvents.
Certain recycled materials are specifically
deemed not solid wastes when it can be shown that these materials
were (1) used or reused as ingredients in an industrial process
to make a product; (2) used or reused as effective substitutes
for commercial products; or (3) returned to the original process
from which they were generated, without first being reclaimed.
Obviously, if such materials are not solid waste, they cannot be
hazardous waste and consequently are not subject to RCRA regulation.
Potential purchasers of a facility will
want to consider what, if any, recycling methods are utilized at
the facility.
For example, is a printing facility recycling any
of its solvents?
Note that an understanding of the regulations
is important since a potential purchaser may want to confirm that
the facility is recycling in compliance with the regulations.
Once it is established that a material
is a solid waste, there are two ways in which it can be designated a hazardous waste:
It can exhibit one of four characteristics (ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or extraction
procedure ("EP") toxicity4)," or it may be specifically named on

4
On March 5, 1990, the EPA signed the Toxicity Characteristic ("TC") final rule, which was designed to modify and expand the EP toxicity test.
The TC differs from the EP Toxicity
test in two ways:
(1)

It expands the list of toxic constituents of concern;
and,

(2)

It establishes regulatory levels for organic toxicants
that are generally obtained by multiplying health-based
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one of three lists published in the Code of Federal Regulations
(hazardous wastes from nonspecific sources, hazardous wastes from
specific sources, and discarded (in their pure form) commercial
products or manufacturing chemical intermediates and their offspecification s p e c i e s ) .
A company generating a listed hazardous
waste may petition EPA to "delist” this particular waste.
A
company seeking to delist a waste must demonstrate that the waste
does not possess any of the qualities or components which could
justify classifying a substance as a hazardous waste.
(ii)

The "Mixture" "Derived-From" R u l e s :

In order to discourage companies from
hiding their hazardous waste by mixing small quantities with
larger quantities of innocuous, nonhazardous waste, EPA fashioned
the so-called "mixture" rule, which provides that, with certain
exceptions, any mixture of a solid waste and a listed hazardous
waste is also a hazardous waste.
40 C.F.R. § 261. 3 (a)(2)(iv).
Thus, if a single drop of a listed hazardous waste is combined
with 20, 000 gallons of wastewater, the 20, 000 gallons of water
containing the listed waste is itself a hazardous waste.
A
mixture of solid waste with a waste exhibiting a hazardous
characteristic, however, is hazardous only if the mixture itself
exhibits a hazardous characteristic.
The derived-from rule provides that any
waste generated from the treatment, storage, or disposal of a
listed hazardous waste is itself a hazardous waste 40 C.F.R.
S 2 6 1 . 3 (c)(2)(i). Therefore, even if a listed hazardous waste is
treated so that it no longer presents health concerns, the
remaining residue is still subject to hazardous waste regulation
unless EPA grants a site specific delisting petition.
On December 6, 1991, the D.C. Court of
Appeals held EPA's mixture and derived-from rules invalid because
EPA had not provided adequate notice or an opportunity for public
comment.
Shell Oil Co. v. E P A . 950 F. 2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The Court of Appeals reviewed the history of the rulemaking
proceeding and concluded that mixture and derived-from rules were
"chronic toxicity reference levels" by a dilution attenuation factor which is generated using a ground
water fate and transport model.
EPA estimates that 99% of new wastes coming into the hazardous
waste management program due to the TC rule will be industrial
wastewaters.
The new provision will also expand the type and
amount of wood treating wastes considered "hazardous wastes".
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a substantial departure from the proposals originally published
by EPA which the public could not reasonably have anticipated.
Since the court held the regulations invalid on procedural
grounds, it did not attempt to reach the question whether the
regulations exceeded EPA's statutory authority.
Apparently recognizing EPA's concerns
that invalidation of the mixture and derived-from rules could
open significant loopholes in the regulation of hazardous waste,
the court suggested that EPA could readopt the mixture and
derived-from rules on a temporary basis under the "good cause”
exemption in the Administrative Procedure Act.
On February 18, 1992, EPA readopted the
mixture and derived-from rules on an interim basis, but the new
regulations contained an unprecedented one-year sunset provision.
57 Fed. Reg. 7628 (published March 3, 1992).
Under this sunset
provision, the temporary regulation expires on April 28, 1993.
In the meantime, EPA is required to undertake rulemaking proceedings to adopt new regulations that will replace the interim
mixture and derived-from rules.
Immediately after the decision in Shell
O i l . EPA filed a petition for rehearing and a request for clarification that the court's judgment was not retroactive.
EPA
argued that retroactive application of the judgment invalidating
the mixture and derived-from rules could have serious adverse
effects on numerous pending enforcement proceedings.
The court
of appeals denied the Agency's petition for rehearing and denied
the motion for clarification of the court's judgment without
comment.
When EPA readopted the mixture and
derived-from rules under the "good cause” exemption, it included
in the public notice a formal statement of its view that the
Shell Oil decision should not be applied retroactively.
57 Fed.
Reg. 7630-31.
This statement of the Agency's position of nonretroactivity was substantially identical to the argument it had
made to the court of appeals when it unsuccessfully sought
clarification of the judgment.
Although EPA's readoption of the mixture
and derived-from rules appears to have reinstated the rules as
valid regulations on a prospective basis, it is unclear whether
EPA's argument against retroactive application of Shell Oil
should be viewed as persuasive in any pending enforcement proceeding.
Stated more simply, it is unclear at this point whether
any valid mixture and derived-from rules existed prior to February 18, 1992.
The decision in Shell Oil has significant implications for state law because the hazardous waste
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regulations in many states incorporate by reference large portions of EPA's RCRA Subtitle C rules, including the mixture and
derived-from rules.
In Arkansas, for example, Section 3(a) of
the Hazardous Waste Management Code provides that:
The following regulations promulgated by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency are
hereby adopted as provisions of [the Arkansas
Hazardous Waste Management Code] as though
set forth herein line for line and word for
word. . . .
Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [Parts 260-266, 268, and
270, with certain limited exceptions and modifications].
The EPA
regulations incorporated by reference into the Arkansas Hazardous
Waste Management Code include the mixture and derived-from rules.
In the wake of the Shell Oil decision,
EPA and ADPC&E have taken the position that the state mixture and
derived-from rules continue to be valid even though the court of
appeals invalidated the EPA regulations upon which the state
rules had been based.
They argue that the states have independent authority to adopt their own hazardous waste regulations and
the adoption of state mixture and derived-from rules constitutes
a valid exercise of the state rulemaking authority.
EPA and
ADPC&E point out that the procedural flaw in the federal regulation, i . e . . inadequate notice and opportunity to comment, is not
a problem with the state mixture and derived-from rules because
the states gave clear notice and ample opportunity to comment
upon the terms of the federal rules that they proposed to incorporate into state law.
In addition, EPA and ADPC&E contend that
a valid federal mixture and derived-from rule has always been in
effect because they view Shell Oil as having only prospective
effect, and EPA readopted the mixture and derived-from rules
before the court of appeals mandate officially invalidated the
original regulations.
The position taken by EPA and ADPC&E on
this question is subject to serious question.
It is true, of
course, that ADPC&E has the authority to adopt its own hazardous
waste regulations, independent of any rules adopted by EPA.
In
this instance, however, ADPC&E did nothing more than incorporate
by reference an admittedly invalid federal regulation.
The
ADPC&E's principal motivation for incorporating the federal
regulation by reference was to make state law essentially identical to the underlying federal law.
In light of this motivation,
it would seem that any defect in the underlying federal law
should be imputed to the state law as well.
Moreover, since
ADPC&E was anxious to adopt state rules essentially identical to
the underlying federal regulations, the notice and opportunity to
comment at the state level on the merits of the mixture and
derived-from rules was largely meaningless.
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EPA and ADPC&E argue that any defect in
the state mixture and derived-from rules that might have existed
prior to February 18, 1992, was cured when EPA readopted the
federal mixture and derived-from rules under the "good c a use”
exemption.
According to this argument, state law now incorporates by reference the newly adopted, and presumably valid,
federal mixture and derived-from rules.
The general rules
governing incorporation by reference, however, suggest that this
argument is incorrect.
Where one statute or regulation adopts
the terms of another statute or regulation by specific reference,
it is generally held that the adopting statute or rule is not
affected by subsequent amendment or repeal of that statute or
rule that was adopted by reference, e.g ., Bolar v. C a v a n e s s , 271
Ark. 69, 607 S.W.2d 367 (1980); A n n o t . , 168 A.L. R. 627 (1947).
Under this rule, it would seem that ADPC&E's adoption of a state
mixture and derived-from rule by specific reference to the original EPA rules could not be cured by EPA's subsequent readoption
of the federal mixture and derived-from rules.
It should be noted that one state court
has already addressed the effect of the Shell Oil decision on
state law and concluded that the state rules were also invalid.
Eauidae Partners v. Oklahoma State Department of H e a l t h , Case No.
C-91-532 (Dist. Ct. Washington County, Oklahoma, decided January
16, 1992) (invalidating the Oklahoma derived-from rule, which had
incorporated by reference the EPA derived-from r u l e ) .
EPA eventually proposed two options to
replace the mixture and derived-from rules.
The proposal was
published May 20, 1992 in the Federal Register.
57 Fed. Reg.
21450-21522.
It was eventually withdrawn.
However, it is
probably helpful to analyze this previous proposal as the agency
will likely consider similar concepts again.
The focal point of the proposal was the
two modifications to the definition of hazardous waste.
The
first proposal, the concentration-based exemption criteria
(”CBE C ” ), would provide an exit from Subtitle C regulation based
on the concentration of hazardous constituents in a listed
hazardous waste, waste mixtures, treatment residues and media
(including soil and ground water) contaminated with listed
wastes.
CBEC would eliminate some low-risk wastes from hazardous
waste regulation, but it would do so largely within the parameters of the existing hazardous waste regulatory system.
EPA's second option would have more
broadly altered the existing structure of hazardous waste regulation.
The second exemption, based on the toxicity characteristic
(the Expanded Characteristics Option or "ECHO” ) would eliminate:
(1) the mixture rule; (2) the derived-from rule; and (3) hazard-
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(iv)

Used Oil (the special exception):

The 1984 amendments to RCRA required EPA
to propose whether to identify or list used automobile and truck
crankcase oil by November 8, 1985, and to make a final determination as to whether to identify or list any or all used oils by
November 8, 1986. On November 29, 1985 (50 Fed. Reg. 49258), EPA
proposed to list all used oils as hazardous waste, including
petroleum-derived and synthetic oils, based on the presence of
toxic constituents at levels of concern during and after use.
Also on November 29, 1985, EPA proposed management standards for
recycled used oil (50 Fed. Reg. 49212) and issued final regulations incorporated at 40 C.F.R. Part 266, Subpart E, prohibiting
the burning of off-specification used oil fuels in non-industrial
boilers and furnaces (50 Fed. Reg. 49164). Marketers of used oil
fuel and industrial burners of off-specification fuel are required to notify EPA of their activities and to comply with
certain administrative requirements. Used oils that meet the
used oil fuel specification are exempt from most of the 40 C.F.R .
Part 266, Subpart E regulations.
On November 19, 1986, EPA reversed
itself and issued a decision not to list as a hazardous waste
used oil that is recycled (51 Fed. Reg. 41900). At that time, it
was EPA's belief that the stigmatic effects associated with a
hazardous waste listing might discourage the recycling of used
oil, thereby resulting in increased disposal of used oil in
uncontrolled manners.
EPA stated that several residues,
wastewaters, and sludges associated with the recycling of used
oil may be evaluated to determine if a hazardous waste listing
for these residuals was necessary, even if used oil was not
listed as a hazardous waste. EPA also outlined a plan that
included making a determination of whether or not to list, as a
hazardous waste, used oil that is disposed and promulgation of
special management standards for recycled oil.
EPA's decision not to list used
hazardous waste based on the potential stigmatic effects
challenged by the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, the
tion of Petroleum Re-refiners, and the Natural Resources
Council.

oil as a
was
AssociaDefense

On October 7, 1988, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia found that EPA acted contrary to law
in its determination not to list used oil under RCRA § 3001 based
on the stigmatic effects.
(See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council
v. EPA. 861 F. 2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (HWTC II). The court ruled
that EPA must determine whether to list any used oils based on
the technical criteria for waste listings specified in the
statute and in EPA's implementing regulations.

-
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On May 20, 1992 (57 Fed. Reg. 21524),
the EPA decided that the current regulatory structure controlling
the management of used oil destined for disposal provides adequate controls so that used oil will not pose a substantial
threat to human health or the environment. However, it decided
not to list used oil as a hazardous waste. Used oils exhibiting
one or more of the characteristics of hazardous waste and which
are destined for disposal continue to be regulated as hazardous
wastes in accordance with all applicable subtitle C regulations,
except when stored in RCRA subtitle I underground storage tanks.
Mixtures of used oils and listed hazardous wastes are listed
hazardous wastes, and used oil mixed with a characteristic
hazardous waste must be managed as a hazardous waste if it still
exhibits a characteristic.
Such mixtures must be managed in
accordance with all applicable Subtitle C hazardous waste regulations.
EPA also created an exemption for used
oil filters at 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(13) which identifies solid
wastes that are not hazardous wastes. This exemption is limited
to non-terne-plated used oil filters which have been drained to
remove used oil. As a practical matter, if an oil filter is
picked up by hand or lifted by machinery and used oil immediately
drips or runs from the filter, the filter should not be considered to be drained. EPA is requiring that filters qualifying for
the exemption first have the used oil removed using one of the
following gravity hot-draining methods:
(1)

puncturing the filter anti-drain back valve or the
filter dome end and hot-draining;

(2)

hot-draining and crushing;

(3)

dismantling and hot-draining; or

(4)

any other equivalent hot-draining method which will
remove used oil. Then, once the used oil is removed,
it can be recycled (as can the scrap metal).
(b)

Duties and Obligations of
Hazardous Waste Generators:

Each of the generator's requirements are
discussed below. A generator's duties and obligations under most
state laws (including Arkansas) are similar to the federal
regulations discussed here, although generators should consult
the applicable state regulations. Since Arkansas obtained
delegation of the federal RCRA Subtitle C program, it has adopted
through incorporation by reference in the Arkansas Hazardous
Waste Management Code ("AHWMC") most of the federal provisions.
However, some of the AHWMC provisions do vary from the federal
regulations.
-
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EPA defines a "generator” at 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 as:
any person, by site, whose act or process produces
hazardous waste identified or listed in Part 261 of
this chapter or whose act first causes a hazardous
waste to become subject to regulation.
Section 1004(15) of RCRA defines "person" as:
an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation, (including a government corporation), partnership, association, State, municipality, commission,
political subdivision of a State, or any interstate
body.
A person who is not normally a generator can incur generator
liability by engaging in certain activities. For example, a
waste generator who cleans up a spill, or an independent contractor who cleans out a tank and thereby produces hazardous waste
residue, will be considered a generator and be subject to RCRA
regulations. Although EPA has stated that it will respect
agreements between private parties that assign generator duties,
it reserves the right to hold both the original generator, and
any other person whose act first gives rise to RCRA regulation,
jointly and severally liable for compliance with the generator's
obligations at each facility.
*Hazardous waste identification
Hazardous waste generators must determine whether a material
is a hazardous waste by applying the methods for hazardous
waste identification described above.
If the waste is not
listed, the generator must determine if it exhibits hazardous waste characteristics by either testing the waste or
"applying knowledge of the hazardous characteristic of the
waste in light of the materials or the processes used. "
Likewise, the generator should determining whether the
hazardous waste is specifically excluded from RCRA regulation.
*Obtaining EPA identification number
Every generator who determines that he is producing hazardous waste must obtain an EPA Identification Number, pursuant
to 40 C.F.R. Section 262.12. EPA Identification Numbers are
obtained by applying to the EPA Administrator, using EPA
Form 8700-12.
It is illegal for a generator to treat,
store, dispose of, transport, or offer for transportation
hazardous waste without having obtained the Identification
Number. Likewise, it is illegal for a generator to offer
his hazardous waste to transporters or TSD facilities that
have not received such a number.
-
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*The manifest system
In March, 1984, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of
Transportation, EPA published a Uniform Hazardous Waste
Manifest to ensure that hazardous waste destined for offsite treatment, storage, or disposal ("TSD"), actually
reaches its destination and to keep track of its travels
along the way. Generators of hazardous waste are responsible for ensuring that a manifest has been properly prepared before the hazardous waste is removed from the site.
The manifest itself requires that the generator supply the
following information: (1) the manifest document number; (2)
the generator's name, address, telephone number, and EPA
Identification Number; (3) every transporter's name, telephone number, and EPA Identification Number; (4) the designated and alternate TSD facilities' name, address, telephone
number, and EPA Identification Number; (5) the U.S. Department of Transportation description of the waste, including
the proper shipping name, hazard class, and Identification
Number; (6) the number and type of containers used to transport the waste; (7) the total quantity of each hazardous
waste by weight or volume; (8) the waste handling coder and
(9) the generator's certification that the hazardous waste
has been properly described, classified, packed, marked,
labeled, and is in proper condition for transportation.
The manifest must be used whenever a generator transports,
or offers to transport hazardous waste for off-site treatment, storage, or disposal. The generator is required to
designate on the manifest the one TSD facility that is
permitted to receive the waste. An alternate facility may
be included in case an emergency prevents the designated
facility from receiving the waste.
If neither of these
facilities can accept the waste, the generator must either
designate another facility or have the transporter return
the waste.
In the event the generator does not receive a signed copy
of the manifest from the TSD facility within 35 days after
the waste is accepted by the original transporter, the
generator must contact the transporter and the TSD facility
to determine whether the waste and manifest were ever received.
If the signed manifest is not received within 45
days, the generator must submit an Exception Report to the
EPA Regional Administrator that must include a copy of the
manifest and a cover letter explaining the generator's efforts to locate the hazardous waste and the results of those
efforts.

-
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*Pre-transport requirements
In addition to preparing manifests for the shipment of hazardous waste off-site, generators are also responsible for
packaging, labeling, marking, and placarding the waste prior
to its transportation.
EPA has adopted U.S. Department of
Transportation regulations regarding these procedures, which
are found at 49 C.F.R. Parts 172, 173, 178, and 179.
*Accumulation time
EPA's regulations allow a generator to accumulate hazardous
waste on-site for up to 90 days without having to obtain a
TSD facility permit or without having interim status, whether the generator plans to treat or dispose of the waste onsite or plans to ship it off-site to a TSD facility, as long
as certain regulatory requirements are met. In order to
store hazardous waste for this 90-day period a generator
must:
(1)

Place the waste in containers and comply with 40 C.F.R.
Part 265, Subpart I, or place the waste in tanks and
comply with 40 C.F.R. Part 265, Subpart 5;

(2)

Clearly mark on the outside of the container the date
upon which the period of accumulation begins;

(3)

Clearly label the container or tank "Hazardous Waste";
and

(4)

Comply with personnel training, facility prevention and
preparedness, contingency plan, and emergency response
procedures set forth at 40 C.F.R. Part 265, which apply
to interim-status TSD facilities.

This 90-day period may be extended by EPA for up to 30 days
upon a showing of unforeseen, temporary, and uncontrollable
circumstances.
In addition, "small quantity generators"
(described below) have up to 180 days to accumulate their
waste.
*Recordkeeping and reporting requirements
EPA's regulations require that hazardous waste generators
keep three difference types of records. First, the generator must keep a copy of all manifests signed by the designated TSD facility that received the waste for a period of
three years from the date the waste was accepted by the
initial transporter.
Second, copies of any Exception Reports or biennial reports (discussed below) must also be retained for three years. Finally, the records of all test
results, waste analyses, or other date upon which a hazard-
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ous waste determination was made must be kept for a least
three years from the date the waste was last sent to a TSD
facility.
If EPA is the regulatory authority within a
state, hazardous waste generators must submit biennial
reports to EPA.
*Special requirements for small quantity generators
The EPA has established less rigorous regulations for conditionally exempt small quantity waste generators — those
generators who produce no more than 100 kilograms of hazardous waste in a calendar month. Generators of acute hazardous waste may generate no more than 1 kilogram of acute
hazardous waste in a calendar month to qualify for small
quantity generator status. Conditionally exempt small
quantity generators' hazardous wastes are not subject to
regulation under 40 C.F.R. Parts 124, 252 through 255, 268
and 270. Generators who produce more than 100 but less than
1,000 kilograms per month are also exempt from certain SubTitle C requirements (i.e., they have the ability to accumulate wastes up to 180 days).
The records and documents required to be maintained by these
provisions can provide useful information to a potential
purchaser. Therefore, these documents and records should be
obtained and reviewed.
(c)

Treatment - Storage - Disposal issues;

Any facility that treats, stores, or disposes
of hazardous waste, and that is not eligible for an exemption,
must obtain a permit from EPA or an authorized state agency.
Permits incorporate those minimum national substantive standards
that are set out in 40 C.F.R. Part 264. The comprehensive
regulatory scheme of Part 264 includes general standards applicable to virtually all TSDs: identification numbers, personnel
training, facility security, and routine inspection; rules for
preparedness and prevention (such as communication systems and
fire-control equipment); requirements for contingency plans and
emergency procedures; manifest, recordkeeping and reporting
requirements; standards governing the closure, post-closure care,
and monitoring of disposal facilities; and requirements for
financial assurance regarding facility closure and post-closure
care, and liability coverage for third-party property damage and
bodily injury.
In addition to these general requirements,
there are specific permitting standards that govern the design,
performance, and operation of specific categories of waste
management units: containers, tanks, incinerators, waste piles,
surface impoundments, land treatment units, landfills and other
containers.
-
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As a result of the statutory changes in 1984,
all applicants for landfill or surface impoundment permits must
now submit a health assessment addressing the potential for
public exposure to releases from those units. Air emissions at
TSDs will be regulated, and EPA is authorized to add other appropriate conditions to TSD permits to protect human health and the
environment, even if the conditions are not specifically imposed
by Sub-Title C regulations.
EPA is issuing pursuant to a staggered time
frame, regulations prohibiting the land disposal of all hazardous
wastes that have not first been treated to minimize their toxicity, unless an interested party demonstrates to EPA that "to a
reasonable degree of certainty,. . . there will be no migration
of hazardous constituents from the disposal unit or injection
zone for as long as the waste remains hazardous." EPA rulemaking
in this area has established that treatment standards (which may
be expressed as specified treatment technologies or as concentrations of restricted materials in a waste or waste extract) will
be set on the basis of the "best demonstrated available treatment
technology;" which, among other criteria, has been "demonstrated"
through the operation of a full scale facility and provides
"substantial treatment" of the waste.
Most facilities that produce, market, and
burn hazardous waste-derived fuel are required to notify EPA of
their activities.
EPA is directed to promulgate standards to be
used in drafting permits for these facilities.
Initial
rulemaking in this area has banned outright the burning of
hazardous waste fuel and contaminated used oil in nonindustrial
boilers (for example, those located in apartment and office
buildings, schools, and hospitals) unless the boilers comply with
interim status incinerator standards and the notification and
storage requirements applicable to industrial burners of waste
fuels. Furthermore, it is now illegal to transport hazardous
waste fuels without an accompanying manifest.
Eventually, every operating hazardous waste
management facility, regardless of its age or operating history,
must have a final RCRA permit issued in compliance with the Part
264 permitting standards. Congress recognized, however, that the
administrative task of issuing permits to every hazardous waste
management facility would consume many years. Accordingly, RCRA
grants "interim status" to those facilities that (1) were in
existence on November 19, 1980 (or on the effective date of a
change under the Act that rendered them subject to the requirement of obtaining a permit); (2) complied with certain notification requirements; and (3) initially applied for a final RCRA
permit in a timely fashion. Until a permit is finally granted or
denied at the administrative level, an interim status facility is
allowed to continue to operate as long as it meets certain selfexecuting requirements, set out in 40 C.F.R. Part 265. A land
-
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disposal facility lost its interim status on November 8, 1985,
unless it submitted its complete application for a full permit
and certified that it was in compliance with the interim status
groundwater monitoring and financial assurance requirements.
Section 3004(u) provides that all RCRA
permits - including those issued for storage units and for
postclosure care - must require "corrective action for all
releases of hazardous waste or constituents from any solid waste
management unit at [the]... facility...regardless of the time at
which the waste was placed in such unit." These permits must
also contain enforceable assurances that the permittee will
complete the cleanup.
EPA has interpreted this corrective action
authority broadly.
An increasingly important part of the RCRA
program is the use of groundwater protection standards to measure
the adequacy of remedial actions. Once it has been demonstrated
that there is contamination due to releases from a RCRA facility,
the EPA Regional Administrator or a state director is obligated
to craft a permit that will contain specific pollutant concentration limits that may not be exceeded at the boundary of the waste
management area. Those concentration limits may be derived from
any one, or a combination, of three sources: They may represent
"background levels"; they may be the Safe Drinking Water Act
primary drinking water standards; or they may be alternate
concentration limits ("ACLs"), determined not to pose a substantial present of potential hazard to human health or the environment, taking into consideration a number of factors. Because the
use of background levels often dictates selection of a remedy
that is extremely costly, if not infeasible, and because there
are relatively few substances regulated under the Safe Drinking
Water Act, in most significant RCRA groundwater cleanup cases,
there are powerful incentives for a permittee to make an ACL
demonstration.
4.
An individual or company acquiring an interest in
a facility containing a hazardous waste management unit, such as
a lagoon, surface impoundment or tank, should consider the
following:
(a) the facility must be permitted under RCRA and
be operated in full compliance with such permit; and
(b) corrective action to clean up the full extent
of any groundwater contamination at the facility must be instituted, whether or not it resulted from hazardous waste management
activities.
5.
Because the generator of hazardous waste initiates
the waste management cycle, the generator is a central figure in
the "cradle to grave" regulatory scheme. Hundreds of thousands
-
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of businesses such as dry cleaners, printing shops and vehicle
maintenance centers produce varying amounts of hazardous wastes
and are therefore classified as "generators” in the RCRA scheme.
Generators are obligated to comply with a number of requirements
which include proper hazardous waste manifesting, storage and
identification. The failure to comply with these requirements
can subject the generator to civil and criminal penalties. Of
equal importance, the failure by a company to comply with these
basic RCRA requirements may be a sign of past improper waste
management practices and necessitate greater scrutiny on the part
of anyone considering the acquisition of such operation.
6.
Why is a basic understanding of RCRA important?
Anyone advising a business or participating in the sale or
purchase of a business or property should have a basic familiarity with RCRA. The reason for this is several fold. First, and
most obvious, non-compliance can lead to severe penalties.
Second, non-compliance with RCRA, even the simple requirements,
is an indication that this facility may be a risky investment.
Third, a failure to use proper RCRA disposal or treatment facilities can mean that this facility may face CERCLA exposure in the
future as renegade disposal sites are discovered.
E.

CLEAN WATER ACT;
Status of Arkansas stormwater program.

F.

UNDER AND ABOVE GROUND STORAGE TANK PROGRAMS:
1.

See appended chapter.

2.

The Arkansas Tank Program:

UST concerns came to the attention of the Arkansas
state legislature in 1987. Former state representative John
Lipton chaired a Joint Interim Committee to review the impact of
the upcoming federal regulations on UST owners and operators.
The Joint Interim Committee heard testimony concerning the high
cost of insurance, potential for loss of retail motor fuel
outlets in rural areas and the need for the state of Arkansas to
establish its own technical standards along with a state trust
fund. The Committee ultimately recommended that such legislation
be drafted and introduced in the 77th General Assembly.
In 1989, the Arkansas legislature passed Acts 172
(Ark. Code Ann. § 8-7-801 to 813) and 173 (Ark. Code Ann. §§ 87-901 to 909) without a dissenting vote. Section 8-7-802 provides the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology
("ADPC&E") with the statutory authority to promulgate a regulatory program.
Section 8-7-803 provides that this regulatory
program shall be as identical as possible to the federal régula-
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tions. The ADPC&E, in April, 1995, obtained complete delegation
of the federal program.
Consequently, a UST owner or operator
will typically deal with the ADPC&E rather than the EPA. Section
8-7-802 also provides the ADPC&E with the authority to perform
corrective actions at UST sites and recover such costs from the
owner or operator. An annual registration fee is imposed on both
USTs and certain above ground storage tanks (that hold between
1,320 and 30,000 gallons).
The purpose of former Act 173 is twofold. First,
the trust fund provision (§ 8-7-905) allows eligible petroleum
UST owners or operators to satisfy a portion of the financial
responsibility requirements.
Second, it creates a permanent fund
(with a 15 million dollar cap) to reimburse eligible petroleum
UST owners and operators or injured third parties for a specified
portion of corrective action or property damage or bodily injury.
Note that unlike many state trust funds, certain above ground
storage tanks (that hold between 1,320 and 30,000 gallons) may
utilize the fund.
The Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund is capitalized by a yearly registration fee and a $.002 per gallon petroleum environmental assurance fee. The Arkansas legislature in
the 1995 regular session, passed legislation (Senate Bill 688)
that allows bonds to be issued (pledging the.002) to provide
further financial strength for the trust fund.
The trust fund covers and provides reimbursement
for corrective action costs above $25,000 and up to $1,000,000
per occurrence. The scope of coverage for third-party property
damage and bodily injury claims also begins at $25,000 and
terminates at $1,000,000. The trust fund statute was amended in
1991 by Act 65 to provide reimbursement without a deductible for
owners and operators for short-term testing or monitoring required by the federal or state regulations
the tank is found
not to be the source of the release. The intent was to provide
all UST owners and operators in the vicinity of the petroleum
release, an incentive to cooperate in finding the true source of
the release.
UST or AST owners or operators submit claims for
reimbursement to the ADPC&E Regulated Storage Tank Division
("RSTD"). The trust fund Advisory Committee reviews the recommendation of the ADPC&E staff regarding eligibility of all or
part of a claim and renders a decision. The trust fund will
reimburse costs only if proof is provided that:
corrective action has adequately addressed the release;
all annual Arkansas UST or AST registration fees have
been paid;
-
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the owner or operator cooperated with the ADPC&E staff;
the owner or operator was in substantial compliance,
with all state and federal laws and regulations relating to ASTs or USTs; and,
timely notice of the release was given.

The § 8-7-907 prerequisites for granting reimbursement provide a
significant incentive for owners and operators to comply with the
regulations, thereby eliminating or at least minimizing leakage
or spillage in the future.
UST owners or operators should understand that it
is critical they maintain compliance with the relevant federal
and state statutes and regulations to ensure trust fund eligibility. What constitutes "substantial compliance" is not defined in
either the statute or the regulations. The ADPC&E staff consequently has some discretion in deciding what constitutes substantial compliance in their recommendation to the Advisory Committee. The ADPC&E position as to what constitutes substantial
compliance seems to be evolving. Only informal ADPC&E memoranda
limited in scope address the issue. Note that even if the staff
disagrees whether a given UST or AST is in substantial compliance, the Advisory Committee can exercise its own judgment.
Both Subchapter 8 (§S 8-7-801 to 813) and Subchapter 9 (§§ 8-7-901 to 909) require the ADPC&E to promulgate
regulatory packages to implement the key provisions of each
program. The ADPC&E promulgated Regulation No. 12 to not only
incorporate virtually the entire federal program, but to set
forth the details of the state program, especially the reimbursement process.
Regulation No. 12 addresses a range of UST-related
topics including ADPC&E facility access for inspection, registration/licensing fees, fund eligibility, reimbursement claims
procedure and reimbursement application review. A major portion
of the regulation is devoted to the licensing of storage tank
installers and tank testers. The regulation makes clear that for
any claim against the trust fund, the associated release must
have been discovered and reported after February 22, 1989. The
ADPC&E is currently circulating extensive proposed revisions to
Regulation No. 12.
UST and AST releases can potentially cause property damage and/or bodily injuries. Consequently, a UST or AST
release can potentially trigger lawsuits for recovery of damages.
The trust fund can reimburse, subject to a $25,000 deductible,
third-party property damage and/or bodily injuries caused by AST
or UST releases.
-
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The trust fund statute and ADPC&E Regulation No.
12 provide that judgments for damages that fit within the scope
of the terms "property damage" and/or "bodily injury" are reimbursable.
In addition, both the trust fund statute and the
ADPC&E Regulation No. 12 have set up a procedure by which ADPC&E
storage tank staff can recommend to the Advisory Committee (which
also oversees this reimbursement process) a settlement of thirdparty claims if the anticipated cost of a trial (if a judgment
was obtained) would exceed a settlement amount. Because the vast
majority of UST and AST releases causing property damage and/or
bodily injury are not insured, the role of the trust fund in
facilitating settlement or reimbursing a judgment of valid claims
is critical.
The Trust Fund reimburses not only third parties,
but also the eligible owner/operator for at least part of her
required "corrective action." The regulation contains fairly
detailed instruction as to the form of the application, required
receipts, and definitions of "allowable" and "reasonable" costs.
As with third-party reimbursement, the corrective action reimbursement approval process flows from the ADPC&E staff to the
Advisory Committee to, ultimately, the Arkansas Pollution Control
and Ecology Commission.
In addition to Regulation No. 12, the ADPC&E RSTD
has recently published informal, yet strongly suggested,
guidelines to further assist owners/operators in the corrective
action reimbursement process. Because Regulation No. 12 allows
reimbursement only for "reasonable" costs incurred to correct a
release, the guidelines are intended to provide insight into the
costs the ADPC&E will deem reasonable and, therefore, reimbursable.
The guidelines offer quite specific information
concerning the selection of equipment (lease versus buy), the
calculation of a consultant's profit, and even limits to the
percentage ownership of consultants/vendors by owners/operators
so as to avoid conflicts of interest that could jeopardize
reimbursement. A matrix of reasonable and customary charge for a
typical clean-up is provided, comparing Arkansas rates to Louisiana and Tennessee.
Finally, a series of one-page EPA publications titled "Controlling UST Cleanup Costs" is attached to the
guidelines.
In summary, the Arkansas Storage Tank Program is
in reality an accumulation of law from five sources:
federal
statutes (RCRA, CERCLA, etc. ), federal regulations, states
statutes (petroleum storage tank trust fund statutes), state
regulations (No. 12), and ADPC&E guidelines.
It cannot be
emphasized enough that the UST/AST owner/operator must comply
with all applicable law at each appropriate step in the process.
-
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Otherwise, the availability of the trust fund to offset the
associated costs of a release may be jeopardized if not forfeited.
An article providing an in-depth analysis of
storage tank trust funds is found at, Wright, In Storage Funds We
Trust; An Analysis of Their Role in Protecting the Environment
and Small Businesses. 13 U.A.L.R. L.J. 417 (1991).
3.

Third-Party Property Damage and Bodily Injury
Claim Issues;

As previously described, some of the state petroleum storage tank trust funds provide coverage for third-party
property damage and/or bodily injury claims. Most of the state
trust fund statutes and regulations do not clearly specify how
the third-party claim reimbursement process works. For example,
a number of state trust funds simply provide coverage if a
judgment is obtained against the owner or operator. The judgment
must be for damages encompassed by the terms "property damage"
and "bodily injury." Whether or not, for example, certain
alleged damages such as "mental distress” constitute "bodily
injury" for trust fund purposes is an open question.
A number of trust funds allow the storage tank
owner or operator to settle the third-party claim and obtain
reimbursement if the state environmental agency or reviewing
committee determines that it is in the best interest of the trust
fund (i.e., proceeding to trial will result in a larger amount).
A related issue usually arises shortly after the
discovery of petroleum contamination at a facility. Some state
environmental agencies will require the storage tank owner or
operator to enter into a consent administrative order ("CAO") to
ensure timely investigatory and corrective action efforts. The
CAO will often include Findings of Fact stating that the UST is
the source of a petroleum release. Counsel should carefully
scrutinize and revise the CAO to ensure that they do not jeopardize the inevitable third-party property damage or bodily injury
claim defense against suits brought by adjacent or nearby landowners. The state environmental agency should, of course, be
somewhat sympathetic since there is not a strict need for an
admission of certain facts, and they may, in fact, ultimately
have to fund the payment of such third-party claims with trust
fund monies.
Another related issue involves the negotiation of
access agreements. Often the UST or AST owner or operator must
obtain access to adjoining or nearby properties for placement of
investigative or remediation equipment to address the release.
Both the adjoining or nearby landowner and UST/AST owner or
operator must carefully consider a variety of issues in negotiat-
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ing the access agreement. These include admission of liability,
insurance, repairs once the work is completed (for example, is a
"patched" parking lot adequate? ), interference with continued use
of the property, etc. In Arkansas for example, the ADPC&E may
(through Ark. Code Ann. § 8-7-807(c)) use certain authorities to
obtain access to a property if it is denied in certain circumstances. The legality of these statutes is untested in the
courts.
Plaintiffs' attorneys often face interesting
issues. On the one hand, they have an incentive to allege in
their pleadings that the storage tank owner did not strictly
comply with the relevant federal or state regulations in an
attempt to advocate punitive damages. Yet, pushing this issue
may not be helpful to the plaintiff if a storage tank owner that
is attempting to convince the state environmental agency personnel that he or she should be eligible for trust fund reimbursement (i.e., is the UST/AST in "substantial compliance?"). Noncompliance storage tank owners without access to the trust fund
may be unable to satisfy a judgment, leaving the winning plaintiff without recovery.
State environmental agencies are also beginning to
grapple with the reimbursement of third-party property damage and
bodily injury claims. As mentioned, the reimbursement procedures
are often unclear.
In addition, the scope of the terms "property" damage and "bodily" injury is subject to various interpretations. Parties settling third-party property damage and bodily
injury claims must consider the state environmental agencies
views of these definitions.
For example, a defendant storage
tank owner would want to ensure that the settlement clearly
reflects and documents the fact that damages suffered by plaintiff fall within the scope of the terms "property damage" and
"bodily injury" as defined by the agency. State environmental
agency personnel are often uncomfortable with their developing
role as claims adjusters.
Failing to coordinate with state
environmental agency personnel could result in the denial for
reimbursement of some or all third-party claims.
The scope of the terms "property damage" and
"bodily injury" will be important. The federal regulations
provide that these terms are defined by state law. State common
law, however, does not typically consider whether items such as
access fees (i.e., monies paid to a landowner to allow a temporary placement of wells) constitute "property damage." Further,
are costs expended to preserve the value of the property (i.e.,
remote sensing devices for temporarily abandoned houses) within
the scope of the term property damage? Certainly, these costs
may constitute corrective action expenses. However, there will
be a number of instances in which the storage tank owner is, or
will be, expending one million dollars on the corrective action
side of the trust fund program. Therefore, the storage tank
-
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owner may have an incentive to classify a number of costs as
third-party property damage or bodily injury claims. These
issues must be considered, to the extent possible, early in the
third-party claim resolution process.
Arkansas attorneys representing either UST/AST
owners or operators or third-party plaintiffs seeking property
damage and/or bodily injury claims must recognize the critical
role of both the ADPC&E RSTD and Legal Division staff in addressing these issues. Both as a legal and a practical matter, they
play a key role in the resolution of corrective action and thirdparty property damage and/or bodily injury claims.
In the case
of third-party claims, the ADPC&E staff will recommend to the
trust fund Advisory Committee whether or not they believe the
proposed settlement between the plaintiff and the UST or AST
owner or operator is in the best interest of the trust fund.
Consequently, all parties should ensure that the ADPC&E staff is
consulted at the earliest point at which it appears a settlement
is beginning to materialize. Note that a settlement agreement
should, of course, have a clause making it conditional that the
third-party property damage and/or bodily injury claim is approved by the trust fund Advisory Committee.
It is also important to recognize that in the case
of third-party property damage and/or bodily injury claims, the
Attorney General's staff plays a role. The Arkansas legislature
in 1993 amended the trust fund statute to state that any UST or
AST owner or operator receiving a claim must give written notice
of it to the ADPC&E not later than 60 days after service of
summons. Ark Code Ann. § 8-7-908(d)(1). The ADPC&E is then
required to notify the Attorney General who has the right to
intervene in the lawsuit. Payment of the third-party claim can
be denied if the UST or AST owner or operator fails to give
ADPC&E the required notice. The Arkansas Attorney General's
staff appears to now be intervening, as a matter of course, in
the relevant lawsuits. Consequently, they will also play a role
in resolving these claims through litigation or settlement.
The drafting of a settlement agreement involving
the resolution of third-party property damage and/or bodily
injury claims should consider a variety of issues. A recent
Arkansas example is illustrative. A settlement agreement included a typical merger clause indicating that cash remitted to a
plaintiff settled all claims. However, in the same settlement
agreement, the UST owner committed to demolish two houses and
pave two parking lots. The ADPC&E staff took the position that
the funds for demolishing one of the houses and paving one of the
parking lots actually constituted "corrective action" costs as
opposed to a third-party property damage claim. The staff
indicated that these activities resembled corrective action costs
despite the merger clause. Therefore, the terms of the settlement agreement should be carefully considered in light of trust
-
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fund issues. Ambiguous settlement issues should be discussed
with the staff, and ambiguous language resolved.
4.

rcra

Statutory Causes Of Action:

RCRA (42 U.S.C. § 6972) may provide a site owner
or operator or an adjoining landowner with the opportunity to
recover from a third party for property damage resulting from
USTs. This statute allows a private party to bring a citizen
suit to compel remediation of the contaminated site. Such a
cause of action may be needed if a current UST owner or operator
is requesting reimbursement from a former owner or operator for
the cost of addressing a leak or spill. Thus, if the current
owner or operator can establish that another party is responsible
for the contamination in question, the costs of cleaning up the
site might be borne by that other party.
A recent Ninth Circuit case has potentially
broadened the use of the RCRA citizen suit provision.
In KFC
Western, Inc. v. Meghrig, the plaintiff, a Kentucky Fried Chicken
franchisee, had purchased a service station property from the
defendants in 1975 to establish a restaurant.
In 1988, during
the course of improving the property, KFC found the soil was
contaminated with constituents of refined petroleum products
(lead and benzene). Los Angeles governmental agencies forced KFC
to stop construction and clean up the site. KFC spent $211,000
to remove the contaminated soil, and then sued the prior owners
under RCRA to recover these costs.
The federal district court dismissed the suit,
ruling that RCRA provided only a "public" restitutionary remedy
that only the government could use. On KFC's appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed, stating:
"It would be unfair and poor public
policy to interpret Section 6972(a)(1)(B) [of RCRA] as barring
[private] restitution actions." The Court made clear that
private plaintiffs are entitled to recover cleanup costs incurred
by the plaintiff for past contamination caused by a prior owner.
In so holding, the Court dismissed the contention of the prior
owners that there was no "imminent and substantial endangerment"
to the environment, as required by RCRA, at the time the suit was
filed.
This case is important because it provides present
owners of property contaminated with petroleum a potential
federal cause of action to recover cleanup costs.
In contrast to
the common law causes of action, which can present evidentiary
and procedural problems, liability under RCRA is relatively
simple to establish. Basically, the plaintiff need merely
establish that the prior owner owned the property when releases
occurred. Moreover, under RCRA, the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all attorney fees incurred in bringing the action.
-
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The other edge of this sword should not be ignored.
Someone selling a property with a UST where petroleum
contamination is discovered years later might be held liable for
substantial cleanup costs. The adoption by the states of "riskbased" cleanup standards will reduce, but not eliminate, this
potential liability. The KFC Western case reinforces the wisdom
of obtaining complete environmental releases from the buyer when
selling properties with USTs.
The decision by the Ninth Circuit in is controlling law in California, Nevada, Arizona, Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, Montana, Alaska and Hawaii. The decision also is likely
to be highly influential in courts throughout the United States
when addressing the right of private parties to sue for cleanup
costs under RCRA.
G.

ADPC&E REGULATION NO. 1 ;

H.

ASBESTOS:
1.

Federal OSHA:

Revised standards for occupational exposure to
asbestos in the general, construction, and shipyard industries.
59 Fed. Reg. 40964. New worker protection, notice, etc.
standards.
2.
I.

Arkansas Asbestos Abatement Regulations:

ARKANSAS SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT:

Note comprehensive revisions to ADPC&E Regulation No.
22 addressing both commercial and non-commercial landfill
standards.
II.

SPECIFIC COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS:
A.

PURCHASE AND SALE OF IMPROVED AND UNIMPROVED REAL
PROPERTY:

Real estate purchases may present unexpected
environmental liabilities if there are sources of contamination
on the property. Under CERCLA (and state counterparts) and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (along with other federal
environmental statutes) purchasers, even without knowledge of the
property's contamination, can be ordered to pay for the cleanup.
The reasons for such expansive liability are the previously
discussed responsible party terms such as "owner" and "operator"
found in the federal (and sometimes state) statutes such as
CERCLA. Contamination on the property is not the only concern.
A purchaser taking title to a facility will be responsible for
-
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expending funds to address violations or upgrade equipment that
is required by the federal and state environmental regulatory
programs.
For example, a buyer purchasing a facility with the
Clean Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit will be required to take whatever action is
necessary to ensure that the effluent discharge is within permit
limitations.
Similarly, the purchaser of a grocery convenience
store utilizing underground storage tanks will be required to
upgrade these systems by the applicable deadlines. Whether or
not the seller is required to inform the buyer of the responsibility he or she may be accepting is the subject of a recent
Arkansas Supreme Court decision. A recent Arkansas Supreme Court
decision indicated that the seller may not have a responsibility
to provide buyer with notice of the federal and state underground
storage tank upgrade requirements.
See generally Wright, In
Storage Tank Funds We Trust: An Analysis of Their Role in Protecting the Environment and Small Business. 13 U. Ark. Little
Rock L.J. 417 (1991).
B.

LEASING:

Lessors and Lessees often negotiate and draft leases
without carefully considering how environmental risks and
liabilities are to be allocated between the parties. Lessors or
lessees who fail to account for environmental risks in lease
agreements could face unplanned expenditures for remediating
contamination and/or complying with federal or state environmental regulatory requirements. The federal and state statutes and
regulations can potentially impose obligations on both lessors
and lessees of improved and unimproved real properties. These
federal and state statutory and regulatory programs can effect
leasing activities in three ways:
(1)

exposure of lessors and lessee to environmental liability (For example, see the previous CERCLA discussion
noting that lessors or lessees can be held responsible
for contamination even though activity is limited to
passive property ownership);

(2)

prevent lessor or lessee from performing under the
lease; and

(3)

impair lessees's utilization of the property.

The regulatory programs related to underground storage
tanks offers an example of the need to consider environmental respon
sibilities prior to entering into a lease. Petroleum refiners and
wholesalers often lease facilities with underground storage tanks to
independent retailers. The RCRA Subtitle I provisions (identical
provisions are found in the Arkansas Underground Storage Tank statutes) liability provisions place responsibility for violations on
both the owner (even if passive) or operator. Therefore, the lessor
-
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refiner or wholesaler may be held responsible for underground storage
tank regulatory violations even if the lease provides that lessee
must maintain compliance with these programs. A discussion of this
issue in the underground storage tank context can be found at Wright,
In Storage Tank Funds We Trust: An Analysis of Their Role in Protecting the Environment and Small Business. 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
417, 425 (1991).
In order to minimize potential environmental liabilities,
the lessor or lessee must identify, evaluate and manage environmental
risks prior to entering into a lease and during the lease period. A
discussion of the use of environmental assessments and the allocation
of environmental responsibilities is found in sections IV and V of
this outline. However, both the lessor and lessee's perspective on
these issues can be summarized at this point.
The lessor's principle interest will be to maintain the
value of the property and avoid environmental liability. Therefore,
lessor should require that the lessee comply with all relevant
federal and state statutes and regulations. The lessee should also
be required to explain in detail his or her proposed use of the
property. The lease should require that the lessee inform (and
receive permission) for the proposed use of the property. The lessor
will, of course, need a lease provision that provides him or her the
opportunity to assess the lessee's use of the premises. Finally, the
lessee should be required to inform or copy lessor on any notices or
correspondence that he provides to federal or state environmental
agencies (i.e., spill reports, etc.).
In contrast, the lessee must ensure that he or she does not
take possession of property which will subject it to some type of
environmental liability. Therefore, in many instances, the lessee
may find it important to perform an investigation so as to establish
an environmental baseline for the property at the start of the lease.
The lessee should receive assurances from the lessor in the form of
covenants and warranties of the property's condition. Further, the
lessee should not allow an overly cautious lessor to unnecessarily
restrict his or her use of the property with overreaching
environmental covenants.
C.

OIL/GAS PROVISIONS:
1.

Lease:

Implied duty of restoration by lessee?
Sanchez, 289 Ark. 582, 715 S.W.2d 444 (1986).
2.

Bond v.

Mineral and Royalty Conveyances:

Key potential for multiple "owner,” or operators under
CERCLA and related laws.
-
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Review
— authority to or actual control
— ownership rights (holding some of the "sticks” in
the bundle of rights.
(Right of control? )
Note Quaker v. United States. 681 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
1988).
Surface owner held to be "owner" under Section 311 of the
federal Clean Water Act and therefore he was responsible for cleanup
of oil containment pit. The pit was used by a previous lessee. Pit
or pond used by mineral owner?
3.
Note oil/gas lessee may want to limit its "ownership"
and "operating" control over pre-existing contaminated surface
locations. Define area precisely of surface and subsurface rights.
Exclude certain area.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS/CONTRACTUAL
ALLOCATION OF LIABILITIES:
A.

Environmental Assessment:
(1)

Overview:

An EA provides information to parties relating to
contamination and/or environmental regulatory compliance of improved
and unimproved properties. The objective of the EA is to not only
identify potential environmental contamination or regulatory compliance issues, but to avoid the need for guarding against or negotiating around the unknown. Data gathered and interpreted in the EA will
provide the parties vital information for decision making and adoption of negotiation postures.
Information provided by the EA may also be needed for
the effective use of some of the other environmental issue resolution
tools discussed in this article. For example, a seller requested to
warrant the absence of certain contaminants and substances should be
reluctant to provide such a provision for a given area unless there
is some level of confidence that none are present. Unless the seller
has comprehensive knowledge regarding the previous uses of this
portion of the property, an EA by the seller or both parties may be
prudent prior to agreeing to such a warranty.
Likewise, a buyer considering the purchase of a
facility with USTs such as a gasoline convenience store or truck
terminal may want to assess the regulatory compliance status of this
equipment. USTs in substantial compliance with the relevant environmental regulations may be eligible for reimbursement for the remediation of post-acquisition petroleum leakage or spillage pursuant to
the Arkansas Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund.

-
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A buyer or lessee may use an EA to attempt to identify
and quantify environmental risks related to the property or facility.
Both recognize that the federal and state environmental statutes may
impose remediation obligations on them for contaminants discovered
after closing.
Besides the simple identification of substances or
contaminants that may or may not require remediation, the optimal
result for an initial or subsequent EA is the quantification of the
cost to perform such remediation.
Both the seller and the purchaser sometimes have an
incentive to establish a rough baseline through an EA. A baseline is
an attempt to document the environmental conditions in existence at
the time of closing against which future changes can be judged. A
seller of a facility or property might use an appropriate baseline to
defend against an allegation that hazardous substances discovered
after closing were generated by the former owner rendering him or her
a CERCLA responsible party.2
Also consider a lessee preparing to execute a lease
for a gasoline grocery convenience store or a bulk motor fuel plant.
If the facility will be utilized for a similar use, the lessee might
be taking a serious risk if a baseline is not set prior to acquisition of the leasehold. Otherwise, the lessee may not have the
information to counter lessor's argument that contamination existing
at the end of the leasehold term was caused by lessee's use. Obviously, the lessor may also wish to set a baseline prior to the
beginning of the lease term so that the lessee cannot claim that
subsequently discovered motor fuel spillage or leakage was preexisting. As a practical matter, as discussed below, Arkansas
facilities with certain petroleum USTs and above ground storage tanks
("ASTs") may be eligible for some cleanup cost reimbursement from the
Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund if certain statutory prerequisites
are met.
Equally important, the EA should be structured to
provide the buyer and lessee the projected future cost of compliance
with any applicable environmental regulatory programs. As an example, consider a lessee contemplating entering into a long-term lease
agreement for several gasoline/grocery convenience stores with USTs
in which he or she will be contractually allocated environmental
regulatory compliance responsibilities. The prudent lessee will
quantify the costs to meet the RCRA Subtitle I UST leak detection/upgrade requirements over the next several years.3 Similarly, a
prospective purchaser or lessee of a building might consider what the
Clean Air Act chlorofluorocarbon phase-out will cost if the air
conditioning system must be modified.4
Regulatory compliance concerns are not limited to
improved properties.
For example, a prospective purchaser of unimproved property in certain suspect areas may wish to determine if it
is subject to the FWPCA Wetland 404 permitting requirements by
-
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obtaining a delineation from the United States Corps of Engineers or
making such determination itself.
(2)

Scope:

The scope of the EA will vary with the type of property or facility.
It is imperative however, that attorneys remind
their clients that the relationship between the value of a facility
and the cost of an EA are not symmetrical. A $75,000 dry cleaning
facility with ground water contamination is a much more serious
threat than a properly operated $10 million manufacturing facility.
Nonetheless, commercial realities will in many instances dissuade the
client from significant assessment efforts on low value properties.
Governmental programs such as the Arkansas Petroleum Storage Tank
Trust Fund may help ameliorate some of the concerns related to
properties with USTs and ASTs and save EA costs in certain instances.
The actual activities that should be performed during
the EA is a combination of the parties' perspective and the potential
activities that have or may have taken place on the property or
facility.
From a potential purchaser or lessee's perspective, for
example, there are standard information items such as current and
past property use and governmental record reviews. While the existence of USTs or asbestos might be a legitimate question at a large
number of commercial facilities, FWPCA or Clean Air Act compliance
status issues will be less frequent. Still, even an unimproved piece
of property may have regulatory issues. As an example, a potential
purchaser considering manufacturing operations adjacent to a water
body will need to investigate the cost necessary to obtain a FWPCA
NPDES permit in this particular area.
Knowledge of the facility's activities or an initial
inspection may indicate that sampling is necessary to determine
whether environmental media have been impacted. Sampling for every
conceivable chemical constituent at the property or facility is not
practical. While a thorough discussion of sampling is beyond the
scope of this article, it is important to note the attorney should,
to the extent possible, ensure that the environmental consultant has
tailored a sampling plan relevant to past or current activities at
the facility.
If, for example, the property has a history of degreasing activities, the sampling would include common degreasing constituents.
In summary, a combination of intuition, judgment, and
experience should be used to tailor the EA's scope of work to meet
the client's needs in a commercial transaction.
EAs are performed by consulting firms with various
types of technical expertise. Attorneys or clients considering the
retention of an environmental consultant to perform an EA should
consider a number of issues. The environmental consultant's qualifications are obviously critical. Different facilities or properties
may require various types of technical expertise. A purchaser
considering the acquisition of several older dry cleaning facilities
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may need the services of a hydrogeologist if sampling for groundwater
and/or soil contamination appears warranted.
In contrast, a lessor
attempting to determine the amount and type of asbestos in his or her
building would need someone familiar with the substance and the
different sampling methods.
A written contract between the client and consultant
to detail the scope of work is always advisable. The scope of work
is extremely important since the perception of attorneys, clients,
and consultants as to what constitutes an adequate EA at a given
property can vary. Misunderstandings can be disastrous.
Consider, for example, a purchaser considering the
acquisition of a closed restaurant that retains an environmental
consultant to perform a "Phase I" EA. The environmental consulting
firm only conducts limited asbestos sampling in accessible areas
pursuant to its understanding of what constitutes a "Phase I” EA. In
contrast, the seller assumes that more extensive asbestos sampling
will be performed because the building is scheduled to be demolished
after closing.
The limited asbestos sampling is performed and the
results are negative. The building is demolished. The Arkansas
Asbestos Abatement Regulations are violated because there was apparently undiscovered friable asbestos behind a large stove. The seller
and consultant disagree as to whether a "Phase I" should include the
type of asbestos sampling that would have detected the material in
this location. This issue would have been addressed if a detailed
scope of work had been negotiated.
It must also be remembered that the EA process will
generate information concerning the status of a given business'
compliance with environmental laws and regulations.
Efforts should
be made to ensure the environmental consultant is contractually
prevented from disclosing sensitive information. An exception to
this restriction might reasonably include governmental requests for
disclosure pursuant to the relevant federal and state environmental
statutes. Consideration should also be given to whether possible
protection of information through the attorney/client or work product
doctrines is possible or desirable.
Finally, environmental consultants sometimes inadvertently use inappropriate and unnecessary verbiage in the EA report.
Consequently, the EA report should be subject to review by the
attorney and client prior to circulation.
(3)

Strategy:

The motivation for a potential purchaser or a lessee
to perform an EA prior to the acquisition of a facility is fairly
clear. Neither the purchaser nor the lessee want to acquire a
-
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property or facility without some understanding of current contamination or the future regulatory compliance costs.
An aggressive potential purchaser or lessee might also
use an EA that simply identifies certain potential unquantified
environmental problems to his or her advantage in negotiations with
the seller or lessor. The negotiations for a warehouse/fleet fueling
facility offers a possible example.
Suppose an initial EA cited the existence of older
petroleum USTs and the failure to obtain a minor air permit for a
paint booth emitting volatile organic contaminants. The buyer or
lessee might propose consummating the transaction without additional
assessment work if a substantial discount in price is provided. The
buyer's rationale for taking this risk would be the belief that the
USTs are covered by the Arkansas Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund
and that the failure to obtain an air permit could be resolved
without substantial penalties. A nervous or motivated seller might
provide a discount to a buyer willing to take risks.
Sellers sometime perform EAs prior to marketing the
property or facility in order to prevent a sophisticated buyer from
utilizing environmental issues as leverage to discount the price.
Advance knowledge and resolution of certain environmental issues may
improve the seller's negotiating position.
Certainly, identification
and resolution of the minor air permit matter referenced in the
previous example would have eliminated its use by the buyer as an
argument for a price discount.
Similarly, a confirmation that the
USTs cited in the previous example were in compliance with the
relevant regulations and consequently eligible for the Arkansas
Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund would provide some comfort about
UST spillage or leakage. Conceivably, the seller could also undertake testing and/or sampling to check for current or historical
spillage or leakage.
If these efforts confirm the absence of problems or result in a resolution, the seller would have a strong
argument that a price discount is not warranted.
A seller undertaking an EA prior to marketing the
property is foregoing the possibility of a potential purchaser
sharing the cost of this work. More importantly, the seller should
recognize that there are risks in undertaking an EA. The most
serious is the possibility that the seller will discover environmental regulatory violations or contamination that must be reported to
the federal or state environmental agencies.
The seller may also have to address these issues. If
the seller continues these non-compliant activities after learning of
them, the violations become knowing and penalties can escalate
significantly. The same is true for failing to notify the relevant
governmental authorities about reportable releases or contamination.
Therefore, if the seller is considering the performance of an EA, he
-
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or she must be prepared to address the violations or conditions
discovered.
(4)

Advantages to the Buyer (Summary):

The principal advantages to the buyer/investor from
the environmental site assessment is determining any risks and
liabilities associated with the site. Specifically, the environmental site assessment can quantify the:
(a)

probability of a site problem;

(b)

extent of the problem;

(c)

potential financial liability; and

(d)

cost of the cleanup.

With this information, the buyer can determine and negotiate the
condition of the acquisition.
(5)

Advantages to the Seller (Summary):

(a) The seller also benefits from an environmental
site assessment of the property before a sales transaction is structured or before a buyer has been identified. Environmental problems
discovered after the transaction has been structured at the insistence of the buyer puts the seller at a distinct disadvantage.
(b) Advance knowledge of site problems improves the
seller's negotiating position. The seller may wish to redefine the
property boundaries to leave out problem areas, or negotiate with the
buyer for some type of cost sharing arrangement for the cleanup.
(c) If the seller conducts an environmental site
assessment and finds a problem, it can be resolved and a resolution
documented before a buyer is identified. Documentation that the site
is clean is required by many informed buyers and can accelerate the
sale.
(d) Of particular importance to the seller is reducing long-term liability and providing protection against future
claims. By documenting site conditions at the time of sale, the
seller protects against a buyer coming back at some future time
requesting cleanup or a newly discovered problem on the site.
(6)

The New ASTM Environmental Auditing Standard:

As previously described, Superfund provides a very
limited defense for purchasers that acquire property with hazardous
substances that neither knew nor had no reason to know of their
existence. The American Society of Testing and Materials (”ASTM")
-
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has attempted to define the necessary audit or review procedures to
meet the CERCLA innocent landowner defense. It was also an attempt
to put in writing good commercial and customary practices along with
the facilitation of high quality environmental assessments.
ASTM has actually promulgated two specific procedures.
One standard addresses phase one environmental assessments and the
other, transaction screen process, is designed to be performed by the
non-environmental professional. The ASTM standards outline the
working principles of both the ESA and the transaction screen standard practices.
The transaction screen is primarily a questionnaire
that consists of up to 23 questions.
It is designed to be administered by either a purchaser of the property or the lender for the
purchase at little or no cost other than personal time. Three
parties complete the questionnaire:
* the owner of the property;
* the operator of the property; and
* the user of the transaction screen
(the purchaser or the lender).
Each is required to answer certain questions with yes, no, or unknown. These questions include whether there are any underground
storage tanks, burial of substances, etc.
Unlike the transaction screen standard, the ASTM
standard for a phase one is required to be conducted by an environmental professional (i.e., someone who possesses sufficient training
and experience necessary to conduct a site reconnaissance, interviews, and has the ability to develop conclusions regarding recognized environmental conditions). The ASTM phase one requires more
information and is more costly.
B.

Allocation of Risks:

Contracts, including those for the purchase and sale of
commercial/industrial properties, should generally allocate risks
between the parties. Environmental risks should be addressed in such
allocation.
(Note: These principles should also generally apply to
leasing arrangements and lending).
1.
Desired environmental risk allocations may sometimes
be provided inadvertently by general provisions in existing contracts.
2.
The direction and degree of environmental risk allocations in contracts may be dictated by the bargaining power of the
parties (e.g., major oil company selling retail gasoline outlet to
independent gasoline marketer).
-
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3.
The desirability of environmental risk allocatio
be affected by cost implications (e.g., seller will indemnify buyer
for all known and unknown environmental problems only if purchase
price is increased by 25%).
C.

Defining Risks:

Defining environmental risks and negotiating their allocation should be considered carefully in light of:
1.
Evolving scope of environmental liability (e.g.,
development of federal and state laws which are continually focusing
on new environmental problems).
2.
Evolving regulatory requirements (e.g., development of
federal and state regulatory programs that are continually altering
what type of activities require a permit).
3.

Identification of "new" risks:

(a) advances in detection technology (e.g., further
advances in determining when natural resources such as ground water
are contaminated);
(b) advances in determining and verifying
cause/effect and health relationships (will friable asbestos in the
commercial building setting be determined to cause health problems);
(c) changes in common law standards of care and
liability (i.e., evolving strict liability standards).
Courts may
decline to interfere where interested and arguably, responsible
parties have allocated liability by contract (see, e.g., Emhart
Industries v. Duracell International. Inc., 665 F. Supp. 549 (M.D.
Tenn. 1987); Mardan v. C.G.C. Music. Ltd., 804 F. 2d 1454 (9th Cir.
1986).
However, note Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex
Corp., 28 ERC 1083 (3rd Cir. 1988).
D.

Objectives of the Parties:

1.
Potential environmental concerns in a certain business
transaction must be identified.
Having identified these concerns,
the objectives of the parties must be identified. Note that one
party may have several roles. A purchaser, for example, may also be
a borrower and a lessor.
2.
or property
what if the
development
buy only if

Purchasers:

(a)
A purchaser will want to buy a busines
that it can cost effectively use as it has planned (e.g.,
Corps of Engineers will not grant a 404 permit for the
of the land for purchase? Or it will grant the permit
a number of acres is donated?).
-
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(b)
A purchaser will not want to accept li
property contaminated by the seller without a price discount or
contractual indemnification by the seller.
3.

Sellers:

(a) A seller may wish to be able to address each
potential concern of the potential buyer. Therefore, the seller may
wish to engage in an environmental investigation prior to the
property's sale.
(b) A seller might be liable for fraud or misrepresentation if it knows or should have known of an environmental
problem which materially affects the transaction and does not disclose that condition to the buyer. The prudent seller may wish to
perform an investigation and disclose what it knows.
(c) A seller might wish to address problems while it
controls the site. Once control is lost, the seller may be ultimately liable but have no control over the scope or timing of the cleanup.
E.

Protecting the Buyer:
1.

The Buyer's Considerations:

Assuming that there is some contamination on the
property to be purchased, the threshold question that must be addressed is whether the buyer should assume all responsibility for
remediation of existing contamination or whether he should attempt to
insulate himself from that responsibility.
(a)

Require the Seller to Remediate
the Contamination:

(i) Buyer by becoming owner of the property has
become a party responsible for the cleanup of existing contamination
under Section 107(a) of CERCLA or other various other federal and
state environmental statutes.
(ii) Seller's remediation activities may interfere
with the buyer's operations, with buyer in effect losing control over
areas of his property.
For example, major oil company sells three
convenience stores to independent petroleum marketer. Each location
has underground storage tank related contamination. The major oil
company agrees to be responsible for cleanup. Unfortunately, several
months after the transaction is closed, the independent petroleum
marketer determines that the remediation methods chosen for each
location will disrupt traffic flow for several months.
It can be
important to retain some control over remedy choices.

-

49-

(b)

Buyer Assumes Liability:
(i)

purchase price.

This would be done in exchange for a better

(ii)
unknown, this is a very risky approach.
(c)

When the extent of the contam

Indemnification of Buyer:

(i) This is usually a more desirable approach
allowing the buyer to remediate the contamination.
(ii) Advantages to the buyer include retaining
control over the timing and implementation of the remediation activities and insuring that the activities are undertaken promptly and
properly.

(iii)
The buyer must be sure that th
have adequate assets to fulfill its indemnification obligation.
2.

Environmental Baselines:

(a) The establishment of an environmental baseline is
one mechanism for allocating responsibilities where the seller is to
become responsible for the cleanup of prior contamination.
In this
situation a potential problem arises regarding the allocation of
responsibility for pre-existing contamination versus responsibility
for post-purchase contamination.
(b) The purpose of the baseline is to quantify the
level of contamination on a property on the closing date so that the
purchaser will be responsible for only increases in that level.
Various sampling programs are available similar to those for the
environmental site assessment.
(c) It should be recognized, however, that even the
best environmental baseline can miss things. A soil sample taken in
one area of the property indicates little, if anything about soil
contamination 50 feet away. Moreover, contamination will migrate
into groundwater and contamination levels will change over time.
Thus, the purchaser is at risk as to any contamination that is not
identified on the baseline because different contaminants or different levels of contaminants identified at a later date on this property will become the purchaser's responsibility.
For these reasons,
baselines are not a fail-safe approach for a buyer.
3.

Leasing:

(a) Where the proposed acquisition is of unimproved
real property, leasing instead of acquiring should be considered.
Once a person becomes an "owner" under CERCLA, he is liable even
-
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though he may never have disposed any hazardous substances on the
property.
(b) Although lessees of property are likely to be
considered "operators” under Section 107 of CERCLA, and therefore
subject to liability, their responsibility for the property is more
likely to be related to their activities during the period of their
occupancy. Moreover, because there is an owner of the property which
the federal or state government can pursue, it is more likely that
the lessee will not be targeted for responsibility for past contamination. The situation will be even more confused when it involves
underground storage tank problems.
(c) In a state with an environmental transfer statute, such as New Jersey's ECRA, a lessee may be required to decontaminate the property upon termination of the lease.
(d) Indemnity clauses in which a lessee agrees to
indemnify and hold lessor harmless, even if the problem was caused by
lessor's actions or fault, have been treated in three ways in the
various states. Most states permit indemnity clauses in commercial
leases, but some require clear, unequivocal language for the indemnity clause to apply to lessor's own negligence. A minority of states
hold that such clauses are void as against public policy.
4.

Disclosures, Representations and Warranties;

Representation and warranties will provide useful
information regarding the other party's knowledge about the condition
of the property. This information can be important in determining
the scope of due diligence for a particular transaction. The objective of representations and warranties is to clearly and accurately
communicate information. A party should avoid giving conclusions
about existing conditions or the interpretation of technical information.
Instead, the party giving the representation should describe
the information upon which the conclusions are based and the source
of the information. Where possible, the party to whom the representations are made should be required to have its own technical advisors to interpret the information.
(a) Representations and warranties regarding the
environmental conditions may require the seller to disclose:

(i)
all the hazardous substances
ed, manufactured, or managed, sent off-site, or released or disposed
of on-site;
(ii)
current site conditions;
permits;

(iii)

knowledge of prior uses of th
possession of all necessary environmental
-
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environmental laws;

(iv)

compliance with applicable permits and

(v)

ties;

actual or contingent enviro

(vi)
threatened or pending litiga
response actions by the government or private parties;
(vii)
may give rise to future litigation;
superliens;

(viii)

knowledge of facts and circum

the existence of environmental liens or

(ix)

ment;

the condition of pollution c

(x)
the presence of PCBs, asbes
toxic substances integral to equipment and buildings; and

(xi)
the existence of wells, unde
tanks, covered-over surface impoundments, and other "hidden" problems; and,
(xii)

investigations by government agencies.

Some of these disclosures may not apply if
only real estate is being purchased and not the ongoing business.
(b) The seller will usually be responsible for the
condition of the property at the time of transfer. However, the
seller should not permit the purchaser's post-transfer activities to
increase the seller's existing or potential environmental liability.
Accordingly, the purchaser's representations and warranties should
include the following matters:

(i)
the purchaser is aware of e
conditions that have been disclosed by the seller;
existing condition,

(ii)
("as is" warranty);

the purchaser accepts the fa

(iii)
the buyer has been given the
conduct an environmental assessment of the facility and either has
conducted such an assessment or is determined that it is not necessary to conduct an assessment;

(iv)
in the event the purchaser d
an environmental assessment, he accepts and will be responsible for
-
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all conditions of the facility, including conditions that would have
been disclosed by such an assessment;

(v)
the buyer will occupy, use,
property in compliance with all applicable laws, including applicable
health, safety and environmental laws;
(vi)
the buyer will occupy, use,
property in compliance with all applicable permits and approvals;

(vii)
the buyer will not treat, sto
incinerate, or recycle any hazardous substances or solid wastes on
the site except as described in an attached exhibit; and,

(viii)
the purchaser will furnish sel
all environmental assessments, monitoring reports, analyses, and test
results and related information upon the reguest of the seller.

(c)
For various reasons, such as a carele
deliberate misrepresentation by the seller, or financial condition of
the seller, a prudent buyer should not rely solely on the seller's
representation but should attempt to verify them through an environmental site assessment tailored to the circumstances.
5.

Indemnification Provisions:

The purpose of an indemnification provision is to
provide a contractual mechanism to reimburse the indemnified party in
the event any of the events set forth in the agreement occur.
However, there are several limitations on the usefulness of an
indemnity.
In many instances, environmental liabilities are not
identified or assessed until many years after the occurrence of the
events that created the liability. During this period, circumstances
affecting the parties on the site may have changed substantially.
For example, the indemnitor may have dissolved or become bankrupt.
Second, indemnification agreements can be difficult to
enforce.
In some cases the indemnitor may refuse to pay the claim
that is the subject of the obligation without a lawsuit.
Third, the indemnitor will usually have no control
over the property or facility that is covered by the indemnification
agreement during the period of indemnification. The activities of a
successor-owner may increase the amount of contamination on the site
or the cost of the remedy, with the result in increasing the seller's
percentage share of liability beyond his actual responsibility.
Additionally, it may be impossible to determine whether the
indemnitor's indemnification obligation should stop and whether the
responsibility of the successor-owner should begin.

-
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Issues Include:

(i)
An indemnification for liabilities fl
activities that took place while the seller held title to the property should be considered by a buyer.

(ii)
The indemnification should cover all e
including attorneys' fees and related litigation expenses. A dutyto-defend provision may also be considered.

(iii)
The buyer should be certain that the in
cation is given by a corporate entity which will have sufficient
assets to meet the indemnification obligation.

(iv)
Typically, if a buyer requests an inde
provision, he can expect to be asked for an indemnity for any posttransfer activities. As long as the indemnity is carefully worded,
this should not create unreasonable liability.
F.

Protecting the Seller:
1.

The Seller's Considerations:
(a)

Liability from Prior Activities:

(i)
The seller must ensure that
ferring title to property that may pose a significant risk of adverse
health or environmental consequences to the buyer, his employees or
the public at large.

(ii)
As selling the property remo
from the seller's control, its use may be changed from one that is
compatible with its current environmental condition to one that is
incompatible with its environmental condition.
For example, a
manufacturing site having low-level soil contamination may meed no
remediation if it continues as a manufacturing site, but would if it
becomes a grade school or a residential housing development.

(iii)
It is therefore prudent to av
ferring properties or businesses that pose a significant risk to
public health or the environment, whatever the future use, unless
provisions are put into the agreement to protect the seller.
(b)

Liability from the Buyer's Activities:

(i) The seller must assure that any contamination from the buyer's activities on the property will not, in the
future, be linked or attributed to him.
(ii) When a seller undertakes to dispose of
property or a business which is associated real property, he should
know the extent of contamination, if any, on the property. If he
-
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does not know, he should undertake an environmental site assessment,
similar to that described earlier, to determine if contamination is
likely to exist.
2.

Disclosure of Environmental Conditions:

As a seller, the first rule is to disclose all knowledge of the environmental condition of the property.
Sellers are
ill-advised to withhold information regarding the environmental
condition of the property.
Even where there has been no affirmative
representation, some cases have held non-disclosure to be the basis
for a cause of action premised upon failure to disclose a material
fact.
3.

Releases:

(a) An attempt should be made to secure a release
from any environmental liability relating to the existing condition
of the property:
(i) where a seller has undertaken substantial
environmental remediation activities on a piece of property, or
(ii) where a seller knows the property to be free
from environmental contamination.
(b) A buyer will be reluctant to grant a release as
to the existing condition of the property, especially where the
property is an old manufacturing facility and it is difficult to know
the complete condition of the property.
4.

Indemnification for Post-Transfer Activities:

(a) Where the seller believes that the buyer's posttransfer activities may degrade the environmental condition of the
property, the seller should consider seeking an indemnification from
any liability associated with these activities.
buyer is likely
contamination.
recognized that
the seller with

(b) If such indemnification is requested, then the
to request an indemnification for pre-existing
In determining the negotiating strategy, it must be
the buyer will have a CERCLA cause of action against
or without an indemnification provision.

(c) "As is” clauses have had varying amounts of
success in releasing a seller from liability to the buyer for environmental conditions affecting the property.
Some courts have held
that an "as is" clause is not effective unless it expressly mentions
the relevant environmental condition. Amland Properties Corp. v.
ALCOA, 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.NJ. 1989). Other courts have held that
they are warranty disclaimers and only serve to bar actions based on
-
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breach of warranty.
Wiegman & Rose International Corp. v. N.L.
Industries, 735 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
5.

Indemnification to the Buyer:

(a) A seller should look for ways to limit his longterm liabilities under indemnification provisions.
Because the
seller's activities are not continuing on the property and liability
is determined by existing conditions, the seller may be able to limit
the extent of the indemnification.
(b) Limitations on liability under indemnification
provisions may include:
(i)

a time limitation;

(ii)
limitations on the extent a
losses (such as excluding consequential damages); and
(iii)
IV.

a cap on total liability.

AUDITS AND ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
A.

INTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS OR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS
(1)

Motivation Risks Related to Internal Audits:

The civil and criminal provisions of the federal and
state environmental statutes are broad, convoluted and complex.
Compliance with the regulatory provisions therefore demands a high
degree of technical and legal sophistication. As a result, even a
sophisticated and conscientious company will occasionally find itself
out of compliance and at risk of criminal prosecution.
If some noncompliance is inevitable, there are two
ways in which it may be identified. The first is through the performance of a compliance environmental audit; the second is through a
federal and state agency enforcement action. An environmental
compliance audit might generally be defined as a "systematic, documented, periodic and objective review of facility operations and
practices related to meeting environmental requirements." In the
alternative, it is a method of verifying that regulations, company
policy, and good operating practices are being obeyed. Self-policing
and correction of environmental compliance, although sometimes
costly, may in some cases be less expensive than compliance pursuant
to agency enforcement actions. However, there are risks. The audits
may uncover instances of historical violations, as well as existing
violations or prospective problems.
Such problems could require
substantial expenditures to correct.
-
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Once such a discovery is made, the company and its
management face the risk of criminal sanctions, as well as civil or
administrative enforcement, if the company chooses to continue to
operate without correcting or abating the violations. Moreover, the
audit may produce findings that, in some circumstances, must be
reported to enforcement agencies under federal or state reporting
requirements, which may in turn trigger enforcement action.
The failure to correct violations or report releases
(as required by federal or state statutes) discovered during an
environmental audit could subject certain employees and management to
allegations that they "knowingly” failed to comply with federal and
state environmental requirements. As will be discussed, the courts
interpreting the federal criminal environmental liability provisions
could conceivably hold certain management officials liable even if
the employee that discovered the violation failed to bring it to
their attention.
Information that an environmental audit may produce
is disseminated to personnel with the authority to act in a timely
manner.
The threats posed by failing to address instances of
noncompliance or reporting requirements are three-fold. First, the
term "person" in federal criminal environmental statutes has been
defined to include corporations.
For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") defines a person as "an individual,
trust, firm, joint stock, corporation. . . or any interstate body."
42 U. S. C. § 6903(15). The ability to prosecute a corporation as a
"person" under the "collective knowledge" doctrine has reduced the
requisite intent necessary to sustain a conviction under the environmental statutes requiring knowing conduct. This doctrine allows the
collective knowledge of a corporation's employees, acquired within
the scope of their employment to be imputed to the corporation. See
1K. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability § 40:05 (1984). Therefore,
a corporation can be convicted for a knowing violation even though no
one employee had actual knowledge of all elements of the violation.
Second, although federal environmental statutes
generally require some degree of intent for criminal liability, the
government need only demonstrate that a person knew what he or she
was doing, and that they did it voluntarily, and not accidentally.
Normally it is not necessary to show that he or she actually knew
what the law required or that he or she acted with the specific
purpose of violating the law. See, e.g ., United States v. Haves
Int'l Corp., 786 F .2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). In Hayes , the court
upheld a plant employee's RCRA conviction, finding that so long as
there is knowledge that the waste is not innocuous, the knowledge
requirement is satisfied. Therefore, the government was not required
to prove knowledge of its classification as hazardous nor knowledge
that a permit was required for its disposal.
Third, the targets for environmental criminal prosecutions are often individual employees of the corporation, in addition
-
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to the corporate entity itself. Such targeted individuals include
not only environmental engineers, but also corporate officers with
broad responsibilities for development of corporate environmental
policies and capacity to influence compliance with company policies
and procedures.
In targeting management for criminal prosecution,
the federal government increasingly relies upon the "responsible
corporate officer" doctrine to define and prove individual culpability. This doctrine allows the government to prove "knowing conduct"
inferentially, based upon the defendant's relative position in the
company, coupled with failure to learn certain facts or take appropriate action.
This doctrine originated with United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943), a non-environmental case (food and drug)
in which a corporate president was criminally charged even though
there was no evidence that he was aware of the unlawful conduct. In
Dotterweich, the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he offense
is committed. . . by all who do have such a responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction which the statue outlaws," and suggested that corporate officers have a duty to learn the facts if
ignorant of them. More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that
doctrine in another food and drug case, United States v. Park, 421
U. S. 658 (1975), where it upheld a criminal conviction of a corporate
officer under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, holding that
the government need only prove that the manager had the responsibility and the power to prevent or correct a violation of the statute.
This prosecutorial tool, imputing knowledge of legal
violations to responsible managers where direct evidence is lacking,
is now being used to prosecute officers under various environmental
statutes.
See, e.g . , United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741
F. 2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d
1123, 1130 n. ll (3d Cir. 1979) (in upholding criminal convictions of
corporate officers charged with federal Clean Water Act ("CWA")
violations, the court noted that the government argued the case on
the responsible corporate officer doctrine and that it perceived no
error in the trial court's instruction on this theory).
Appellate courts have applied this doctrine in an
environmental setting.
In Johnson & Towers, the Third Circuit upheld
the criminal convictions of a plant foreman and service manager,
finding that the RCRA penalty provisions apply to "responsible
corporate officers, " who include employees as well as operators, "if
they knew or should have known that there had been no compliance with
the permit requirement. . . . " id. at 664-65. The broad application of the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine is supported by
the criminal provisions of certain federal and state environmental
laws. CWA, § 309(c)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (1988) (expressly
provides for criminal liability for "any responsible corporate
officer") Clean Air Act ("CAA") § 113(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(3)
(1988) (expressly provides that penalty provisions apply to "any
responsible corporate officer"); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
-
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Pub, L. No. 101-549, § 701, 104 Stat. 2399, 2677 (codified at 42
U .S .A .A. § 7413(c)(6) (West Supp. 1991)) ("the term 'person' includes
. . . any responsible corporate officer").
More recently, however, in United States v. MacDonald
& Watson Oil Co., 933 F. 2d 35, 55 (1st Cir. 1991), another RCRA
enforcement case, a different appellate court declined to extend the
reach of the responsible corporate officer doctrine to permit knowledge to be inferred solely from the defendant's corporate position.
In MacDonald & Watson, the First Circuit held that "a mere showing of
official responsibility" does not by itself constitute sufficient
proof of culpability with regard to criminal offenses that have an
express "knowledge" or scienter requirement.
Distinguishing Johnson
& Towers, where the issue involved knowledge of the law, i.e., permit
requirements, the MacDonald & Watson court held that a company
officer could be held liable under the doctrine only if the government proved knowledge of facts relative to the violation charged.
However, the court acknowledged that such knowledge could be proven
inferentially by circumstantial evidence, including "willful blindness" to the facts.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. 912
F. 2d 741, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1990), has been one of the
more stringent applications of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine.
The defendants in Dee were civilian engineers employed to
develop chemical warfare systems for the Army. Gepp, a chemical
engineer, was responsible for operations and maintenance at the
facility.
Dee and Lentz were Gepp's superiors. As heads of their
respective departments, the defendants were responsible for ensuring
that provisions of various company compliance policies, as well as
the RCRA requirements, were fulfilled within their departments and
that their subordinates were aware and in compliance with those
regulations.
The district court found all three guilty of multiple
violations of RCRA for illegally storing, treating, and disposing of
hazardous waste.
The defendants argued that they did not knowingly
violate RCRA. The defendants claimed that they did not know that
violation of RCRA was a crime and that they were unaware that the
chemicals they managed were hazardous. The court held that ignorance
of the law is no defense and, more specifically, that the government
did not need to prove the defendants knew of the violations.
It was
enough that they knew of the generally hazardous nature of the
chemicals they were handling. Applying the reasoning of the public
welfare statutes to RCRA, the court stated that "where. . . dangerous or deleterious devices or products of obnoxious waste materials
are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone
who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them
must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."
Defendant Gepp contended that there was insufficient
evidence that he directed the storage or disposal operations. He
-
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asserted that "[s]loppy storage procedures is [sic] not a crime." The
court strongly disagreed, stating " [n]egligent and inept storage of
hazardous waste is one of the evils RCRA was designed to prevent, and
§ 6928(d) makes such egregious behavior a crime. " The court found
evidence that Gepp was in charge of operations at the plant, had
originally ordered placement of the hazardous chemicals in a storage
shed, had repeatedly ignored warnings about the hazardous condition
of chemicals that were improperly stored, and had made no effort to
comply with RCRA regulations.
The court found this evidence sufficient for the imposition of criminal liability under RCRA.
Notwithstanding the circumscribed application of the
responsible corporate officer doctrine in MacDonald & Watson, the
responsible corporate officer doctrine remains available to pursue
corporate officers with direct, or even indirect responsibility for
environmental matters.
(2)

Federal Enforcement Positions on Compliance
Environmental Auditing:

A comprehensive environmental compliance audit program
may reveal instances of noncompliance.
The various statutes require
that certain violations or events be reported. However, many do not
have to be brought to the agency's attention. Therefore, it is
appropriate to review the EPA, Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the
United States Congress' (most recent statement) views on the treatment a company should expect if a violation is discovered, voluntarily reported, and expeditiously remedied.
(a)

EPA Environmental Auditing Policy (Summary);

EPA issued a policy statement on environmental
auditing effective July 19, 1986.
51 Fed. Reg. 25004 (1986). The
interim policy statement was published in the Federal Register on
November 8, 1985.
50 Fed. Reg. 46504-08 (1985). The policy was
summarized by EPA as follows:
It is EPA policy to encourage the use of environmental auditing by regulated entities to help
achieve and maintain compliance with environmental laws and regulations, as well as to help
identify and correct unregulated environmental
hazards.
This policy statement specifically:
*Encourages regulated entities to develop, implement, and upgrade environmental auditing programs;
*Discusses when the Agency may request audit
reports (it will not routinely do so);
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*Explains how EPA's inspection and enforcement
activities may respond to regulated entities'
efforts to assure compliance through auditing;
*Endorses environmental auditing at federal facilities;
*Encourages state and local environmental auditing initiatives; and
*Outlines elements of effective audit programs.
51 Fed. Reg. 25004 (1906).
The EPA policy statement cautions that "the existence of an auditing
program does not create any defense to, or otherwise limit, the
responsibility of any regulated entity to comply with applicable
regulatory requirements."
(b)

DOJ Guidance (Summary):

In an effort to provide a framework for determining when to pursue criminal sanctions and to provide the regulated
community with a "sense of how the federal government exercises its
criminal prosecutorial discretion."
DOJ issued in 1991 a guidance entitled Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for
Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary
Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator ("Guidance").
Specifically, the Guidance articulates the factors that the DOJ will
consider in deciding whether to initiate an environmental criminal
prosecution and whether circumstances exist that warrant prosecution
of a lesser charge. It also provides a number of hypothetical examples demonstrating how the criteria should be applied. The Guidance
is relevant since it specifically considers the scenario in which a
regulated facility voluntarily discloses a violation.
The Guidance indicates that it is the DOJ's
policy "to encourage self-auditing, self-policing and voluntary
disclosure of environmental violations by the regulated community by
indicating that these activities are viewed as mitigating factors in
the DOJ's exercise of criminal environmental enforcement discretion."
In other words, criminal prosecutions should not create a disincentive for companies undertaking internal audits and disclosing the
results.
The Guidance articulates six factors the DOJ should
consider in determining whether or not and how to prosecute companies
that disclose violations.
It expressly provides that no one factor
will likely be dispositive in any given case and other relevant
factors, including those not contained in the Guidance, may be
applicable in a given situation.
The first of three main factors is whether the
person made "a voluntary, timely, and complete disclosure of the
-
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matter under investigation.” Specifically, the Guidance appears to
give weight to persons who promptly come forward after discovering a
violation and who provide information that aids the government's
investigation.
Disclosure that is mandated by a statute, regulation,
or permit is not considered voluntary.
The degree and timeliness of the violator's
cooperation is the second main factor considered by the DOJ. Cooperation, as expressed in the Guidance, pertains to the person's willingness to assist the government in its investigation, including providing all relevant data and information.
Specific examples of the
types of information the DOJ may seek include the results of internal
investigations and the names of all potential witnesses.
The third main factor is "the existence and scope
of any regularized, intensive, and comprehensive environmental
compliance program; such a program may include an environmental
compliance or management audit.” The recognizes that various audit
or compliance programs exist, but emphasizes that the programs must
include sufficient measures to identify and prevent future violations
and must have been established in a timely manner.
Specifically, DOJ will look to see:
(1) whether
there was a corporate policy emphasizing compliance with all environmental requirements; (2) whether safeguards existed that exceed those
required by law to prevent violations from occurring; (3) whether
regular audit procedures, with sufficient safeguards to ensure the
audit's integrity, were followed; and (4) whether the company provided sufficient resources for an effective audit program and was
committed to respond expeditiously and effectively to the conditions
discovered by the audit.
In addition to the three main factors, the
Guidance describes three other criteria that may be relevant in a
particular case.
The first criterion focuses on the company's
history of noncompliance.
A company with a history of noncompliance
"may indicate systemic or repeated participation in or condonation of
criminal behavior." The second criterion relates to whether the
company has an effective disciplinary system, which not only punishes
offenders but also alerts other employees that criminal conduct is
unacceptable.
The third criterion is whether and how quickly the
company corrected the violation.
In fact, the Guidance indicates
that "considerable weight" will be given to those persons who undertake prompt, good-faith efforts to reach environmental compliance
agreements.
To further assist federal prosecutors (and the
regulated community), the Guidance includes several hypothetical
examples of how the Justice Department will apply the factors in
evaluating environmental cases.
The examples encompass both ends of
the spectrum— from situations when criminal prosecution should not
occur to situations when the government should pursue the maximum
-

62

-

penalty.
The Guidance notes that each case will differ not only in
which factors are present but also the degree to which the criteria
are satisfied.
The "ideal hypothetical case" described in the
Guidance is one involving a company with an effective compliance
program with established policies and training programs that regularly conduct compliance audits.
Upon discovery of a violation, the
company undertakes an internal investigation to confirm the information about a potential violation discovered by the audit and discloses all relevant information concerning the violation to the government, including the names of those involved in the criminal activities.
It then attempts to correct any false information
previously submitted to the government and disciplines the employees
involved in the criminal conduct.
Finally, the company promptly and
completely remedies the violation and reviews its compliance program
to determine how the violation "slipped through the cracks." In this
situation, the Guidance indicates that the company "would stand a
good chance of being favorably considered for prosecutorial leniency,
to the extent of not being criminally prosecuted at all." The
Guidance provides, however, the degree of leniency will depend on all
relevant factors, including those not addressed in the Guidance.
The Guidance also provides examples of a situation when prosecutorial leniency would be remote, when prosecution of
a lesser charge may occur, or when pursuing employees instead of the
company may be appropriate.
It concludes by providing that "mitigating efforts made by the regulated community will be recognized and
evaluated.
The greater the showing of good faith, the more likely it
will be met with leniency.
Conversely, the less good faith shown,
the less likely that prosecutorial discretion will tend toward
leniency."
(c)

Clean Air Act (1990 Amendments):

The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee
of Conference for the CAA Amendments of 1990 contains hortatory
language specifically intended to encourage owners and operators of
sources subject to the Clean Air Act to conduct self-evaluations and
self-audits.
136 Cong. Rec. 13,101 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). The
Joint Statement provides in part:
Nothing in subsection 113(c) is intended to discourage owners or operators of sources subject to
this Act from conducting self-evaluations or
self-audits and acting to correct any problems
identified.
On the contrary, the environmental
benefits from such review and prompt corrective
act ion are substantial and section 113 should be
-
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read to encourage self-evaluation and self-audits.
Owners and operators of sources are in the best
position to identify deficiencies and correct
them, and should be encouraged to adopt procedures where internal compliance audits are performed and management is informed.
Such internal
audits will improve the owners' and operators'
ability to identify and correct problems before,
rather than after, government inspections and
other enforcement actions are needed.
The criminal penalties available under subsection
113(c) should not be applied in a situation where
a person, acting in good faith, promptly reports
the results of an audit and promptly acts to
correct any deviation.
Knowledge gained by an
individual solely in conducting an audit or while
attempting to correct any deficiencies identified
in the audit or the audit report itself should
not ordinarily form the basis of the intent which
results in criminal penalties.
(d)
December 22, 1995 EPA Policy Statement (60 Fed.
Reg. 66706).
Policy Statement on incentives provided for voluntary
disclosure of violations.
Include reduction of gravity component of
civil penalties and no recommendation for criminal prosecution.
Addresses requests for audits.
(e)

Arkansas and Other State Environmental Audit
Privileges:
See appended outline.

(3)

Protecting Audit Information:

For various reasons, companies may want to keep some
or all of the information generated by the environmental compliance
audit confidential.
Besides the federal or state environmental
requirements, companies could be required to disclose information
developed during the course of an environmental compliance audit in
two instances.
First, the EPA or state environmental enforcement
agency could require submission of information under the various
environmental statutes that authorize these agencies to discover
information and to compel record keeping, pollution monitoring and
reporting, and access for agency inspectors.
The information provided the federal or state agency pursuant to these authorities could
result in an enforcement action or mandate for remediation.
However,
as a practical matter, agency access to such information may not
-
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always be a concern, since the environment compliance audit will deal
with many areas that the federal and state regulations already
require to be reported to agencies, such as permit excursions.
EPA stated in its audit policy that it would not
routinely request the results of environmental compliance audits.
See 51 Fed. Reg. 25, 004 (July 9, 1986). However, EPA specifically
reserved the right to request an audit (or relevant portion of an
audit) whenever necessary for an enforcement action and particularly
when pertinent to a criminal investigation.
DOJ has sought to use environmental audit information
in two recent cases, United States v. Dexter and United States v.
Weyerhaeuser. Walker Trust in Auditing, But Verify. Envt'l. Forum
(Jan./Feb. 1992) at 41 ("hereinafter "Walker").
The author of the
previously cited article, an EPA enforcement attorney, states:
[W]ith the exception of audits initiated as a
condition of consent agreements or decrees, the
EPA, in fact, rarely ever seeks to obtain or use
any information contained in audit reports.
Walker at 41.
The second manner in which an environmental compliance
audit could become public is through discovery requests and civil
litigation brought by private entities.
Parallel proceedings against
a corporation and its officers can occur consecutively or simultaneously.
Proponents in the various actions often request disclosure
of documents and information.
(a)

The Limited Strategies to Protect
Confidentiality:
(i)

Attorney-client privilege:

To obtain the benefit of the attorney-client
privilege for an environmental audit, a company must perform the
environmental audit as part of legal advice from an attorney, rather
than as a routine management analysis.
There is no clear test for a
claim of the privilege; rather, courts evaluate privilege claims on a
case-by-case basis.
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege,
which attaches to corporations and individuals, is to encourage
clients to make full and frank disclosure to their attorneys so that
the attorney may render sound legal advice. The privilege extends to
communications from as well as to the attorney; therefore, it protects both the client's furnishing of information and the attorney's
furnishing of legal advice.
The traditional elements of the privilege
that must be present for a communication to be held confidential are:
-
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(1)

the communication must be made in order to obtain
legal advice;

(2)

the communication must be with an attorney;

(3)

both the client and the attorney must maintain the
confidentiality of the communication; and

(4)

neither the client nor the attorney may have waived
the privilege.

United States v. United Shoe March. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(D. Mass. 950).
Because courts strictly construe privilege claims,
companies must plan and initiate the environmental auditing process
so that the requisites of the attorney-client privilege exist for all
communications that are desired to be kept confidential.
In United States v. Chevron. 1989 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 12267 at 17 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1989), for example, the court
rejected a claim of attorney-client privilege and ordered production
of environmental audit reports, finding that Chevron had failed to
demonstrate that its in-house counsel had been acting in a legal
capacity when she participated in the audit or that the communication
pertained primarily to legal assistance.
(ii)

Work-product privilege:
(A)

Protected material;

The work-product privilege provides a
second potential means of protecting information.
An attorney's
legal analysis of whether a facility may have violated an
environmental statute or regulation is one example of work-product in
the environmental context.
The privilege belongs to and protects
the interests of both the client and the attorney, either of whom may
assert it.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) codifies the
elements of the privilege, which provides qualified protection for
documents, notes, and other tangible things prepared for or by an
attorney "in anticipation of litigation," as well as for "mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney." Most courts have held that the work-product privilege also
protects the work of consultants hired by an attorney on the client's
behalf, although the work may receive the lesser protection afforded
documents.
The purpose of this privilege is to
provide the degree of privacy necessary for the attorney to prepare
the client's case vigorously.
Upjohn Co. v. United States. 449 U.S.
383, 398-99 (1981) (quoting Hickman v. Tavlor. 329 U.S. 495, 511
(1947)).
For this reason, the work-product privilege protects a
-
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broader category of material than the attorney-client privilege.
Despite this broader coverage, the work-product privilege is probably
less useful in protecting environmental compliance audits and supporting documents than the attorney-client privilege.
Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26 permits the disclosure of documents and tangible items that constitute an attorney's work-product upon a showing
of substantial need and the inability to obtain the equivalent
without undue hardship.
Moreover, the privilege only applies when
litigation may reasonably be foreseen, a condition which might not be
present in some instances.
The privilege offers greater protection
for work-product that reflects the attorney's mental processes.
Socalled "opinion" work-product includes memoranda or notes based on
recollection and evaluation of oral interviews. To the extent that an
environmental audit revealed an attorney' s mental processes, such as
evaluations of employee oral statements or questionnaire responses,
then it would constitute opinion work-product.
To maximize the opportunities for
protection of the environmental audit and documents under opinion
work-product, an attorney may actually have to prepare the materials.
Thus, if a company wishes to establish work-product protection for
the environmental audit, the company should structure the review so
that an attorney gathers as much of the information as possible
through employee interviews, and records the information in handwritten notes and memoranda.
Whether or not a company deems such effort
worthwhile, is of course a business decision that will be driven by
the perceived risks of the environmental audit of a particular
facility.
(iii)

Self-evaluative privilege:

The third basis for a claim of confidentiality is the limited protection that may be afforded the selfevaluative portion of environmental audits.
This judicially created
privilege might protect a company's candid self-evaluation of compliance with state or federal laws.
The privilege protects only selfevaluative elements of reports, not the factual material itself.
In
addition, a showing of exceptional necessity can overcome the privilege.
Courts generally decide a claim used on this privilege by
balancing the public policies favoring and opposing disclosure.
The self-evaluative privilege is still
evolving from its first recognition in Bertice v. Doctor's Hospital.
Inc., 50 F. R. D. 249 (D.D. C. 1970), aff'd mem., 479 F. 2d 920 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), and remains largely undefined.
The courts generally
require that three elements be present:
(1)

the information to be shielded from discovery results
from a critical self-analysis by the party seeking
protection;
-
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(2)

the public has a strong interest in preserving the
free flow of the type of information sought; and

(3)

the information must be of the type whose flow would
be curtailed if discovery were allowed.

One might argue that the self-evaluative
privilege is strengthened by the EPA's recognition in its Auditing
Policy, that regulated entities need to self-evaluate environmental
performance with some measure of privacy.
See, e. g., J. Crist,
Reporting, Recordkeeping and Disclosure Requirements for An Environmental A u d i t . 5 (1989).
However, EPA has not guaranteed it will not
request environmental audit information.
This issue has been addressed in the environmental audit context in at least one unreported decision. In
United States v. Dexter Corp., a court ruled that the government was
entitled to obtain certain documents even though they were claimed to
be shielded by the self-evaluation privilege.
Walker at 41. The
court found that the privilege would violate public policy against
discharges of wastes and frustrate the government's enforcement of
the Clean Water Act.
Endnotes:
1.

Ark. Code Ann. § 8-7-901

seq.

2.

CERCLA responsible parties are listed in Section 107(a).
42 U. S. C. § 9607(a).

3.

See generally 40 C.F.R. § 280 et seq.

4.

See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7671 et seq .
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